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Radical Leveling Technologies (RLT) constitute a new class of technologies that 
have exponential disruptive effects across a diverse set of societal processes resulting in 
radical change. This emerging class has profound leveling effects. Users can leverage 
RLT to produce national or international impacts without the need for significant 
technological expertise. These effects may occur via digital diffusion and without the 
need for extensive infrastructure. RLT are being driven by the power and expertise of 
online Open Source Communities. The ability of existing policy and enforcement 
methods to regulate this class of technology successfully, particularly within the 
counterproliferation space, suggests that a paradigm change is necessary. A spectrum of 
potential solutions is considered which advocates for collaborative efforts vice “hard 
policing” measures to engage online communities while also providing options to build 
additional security capacity within the government and law enforcement communities. 
Capacity can be gained via unconventional means including the use of cyber bounties, 
cyber privateering, hybrid fusion centers, and decentralized autonomous technology 
teams to improve support to existing special operations efforts, particularly within the 
counterproliferation mission set. 
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On June 26, 2015, authorities in Hong Kong arrested nine members of a terrorist 
cell who were believed to be planning a series of attacks on government buildings meant 
to disrupt upcoming elections. When the group was arrested, officials discovered a stack 
of pellet air guns, explosives, and a 3D printer. It was unclear how the group intended to 
use the 3D printer in their plot. Producing modified toy guns that function as real 
weapons or creating parts for specialized explosive devices were just two of the many 
possibilities. 
The most important takeaway from this event is how rapidly security policy and 
enforcement are falling behind criminal adoption of advanced technologies.1 A new class 
of emerging technologies is creating significant gaps between policy, regulation, and 
reality across a diverse range of areas. Three-dimensional printing, also known as 
additive manufacturing (AM) or the process of turning digital design into physical objects 
is one such example. In 2012, Glasgow University chemist Lee Cronin turned a 3D 
printer into a pharmaceutical-grade chemical production computer that would allow 
individuals to manufacture their own prescription drugs using chemical recipes posted on 
the Internet. In 2015, Germany produced the first 3D printer specifically designed for 
drug production and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first 3D-
printed drugs for use in the United States.2 While the benefits of such innovation are 
undeniable, the world of illicit narcotics suddenly became much more complicated for 
                                                 
1 Heidi Milkert, “Hong Kong Terrorists Caught with 3D Printer, Perhaps Looking to Modify Airsoft 
Guns,” 3DPrint.com, June 26, 2015, http://3dprint.com/76737/3d-printer-terrorists/; Marc Goodman, 
“Crime Has Gone High-Tech, and the Law Can’t Keep Up,” Wired, March 21, 2015, 1–2. 
2 Eddie Krassenstein, “German Company Aims to Sell 3D Printed Drugs & A 3D Drug Printer.” 
3DPrint.com, August 10, 2015; Susan Scutti, “FDA Approves First Ever 3D-Printed Epilepsy Drug from 
Aprecia; Set to Create More Central Nervous System Pills,” Medical Daily, August 4, 2015; David B. 
Samadi, “You Can Now 3D Print Prescription Drugs,” Observer, August 12, 2015, http://observer.com/ 
2015/08/print-your-prescription-3d-technology-modernizes-medicine/; Dominic Basulto, “Why it Matters 




regulators and policymakers.3 In 2014, Andrew Hessel, a cell biologist and geneticist 
working for 3D-printing giant Autodesk, claimed that he was printing deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) and had created viruses to combat cancer. The process took two weeks and 
cost $1,000. These techniques, if successful, will revolutionize the pharmaceutical and 
medical communities.4 Craig Venter, whose institute created the first synthetic life-form, 
is also pursuing 3D printing as a way to design vaccines that can be produced and shared 
globally in under twenty-four hours. Even amateur labs and biohackers (biology and 
chemistry hobby groups who seek simple solutions to global science challenges) will 
soon be able to join the 3D-printed biological revolution. It is because of these spaces that 
security experts and professionals like Dr. Venter have concerns. Fears that such groups 
may be exploited by bad actors who seek to advance their own threat capabilities are 
accompanied by the concern that individuals participating in these groups may produce 
threats inadvertently due to ignorant experimentation. The public now has easy access to 
tools that allow anyone, even those with no scientific background, to manipulate and 
create with genetic materials. More alarming still is that the use of such technologies may 
critically change the security environment and the way in which future wars will be 
fought by both states and non-state actors.5 
Much of this innovation is occurring in public spaces or online forums, driven by 
a global community of open-source entities who come together voluntarily to work on 
global problems. These “do-it-yourself” (DIY) communities are enabling the exponential 
                                                 
3 Stephen Kotler, “Vice Wars: How 3-D Printing Will Revolutionize Crime,” Forbes, July 13 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenkotler/2012/07/31/the-democratization-of-vice-the-impact-of-
exponential-technology-on-illicit-trades-and-organized-crime/. 
4 Katie Collins, “Meet the Biologist Hacking 3D Printed Cancer-Fighting Viruses,” Wired UK, 
October 16 2014. 
5 Harry Bentham, “Virus: Rebutting the Fear of Synthetic Biology,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging 
Technologies, May 13, 2014. 
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advancement of technologies like 3D printing which are rapidly outpacing national-
government and international-organization regulatory and intelligence capacities.6  
The above examples provide a simple demonstration of how technology is 
challenging security experts on multiple fronts. This thesis will discuss technologies that, 
when combined with the power of Open Source Communities (OSCs), create the ability 
for non-state actors or even individuals to gain access to new forms of power that can 
rival that of a nation-state or can be shared globally via the Internet to empower others 
around the world.7 In other words, we will be looking at jointly sufficient conditions for a 
“radical leveling effect.” These conditions are 1) the technology is disruptive (a game 
changer), 2) the Internet allows it to be diffused in part or entirely via digital 
transmission, and 3) there is very little or no infrastructure or large-scale investment 
necessary to facilitate it. If any of these conditions are not met, then the technology will 
not have radical leveling effects as exhibited by the Radical Leveling Technology (RLT) 
class as a whole. 
In order to focus the discussion, 3D printing or additive manufacturing (AM) will 
be used as the primary representative of this class of technologies. Where appropriate, 
other RLT such as synthetic biology, neurotechnology or the internet will be highlighted 
to illustrate specific points, and the convergence of these technologies will be discussed 
to showcase disruptive effects and provide policymakers with an understanding of the 
                                                 
6 Shane Coughlan, ed., Research on Open Innovation: A Collection of Papers on Open Innovation 
from Leading Researchers in the Field (N.p: OpenForum Europe, 2014); Libby Clark, “Jono Bacon: Open 
Source is Where Society Innovates,” Linux.com, October 14, 2014, https://www.linux.com/news/featured-
blogs/200-libby-clark/791644-jono-bacon-open-source-is-where-society-innovates; Chiara Franzoni and 
Henry Sauermann, “Crowd Science: The Organization of Scientific Research in Open Collaborative 
Projects,” Research Policy 43, no. 1 (2014): 1–20, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2167538; Jack M. Germain, “Next on 
the Open Source Horizon: 3D Printing,” LinuxInsider, May 28, 2014, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/ 
80519.html; Nozomi Hayase, “Blockchain Revolution: Open Source Democracy for the 99%,” 
openDemocracy UK, August 4, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/nozomi-hayase/ 
blockchain-revolution-open-source-democracy-for-99; Eric Raymond, The Cathedral & the Bazaar: 
Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary, 3rd ed. (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 
2001); Robert David Steele, The Open-Source Everything Manifesto; Transparency, Truth & Trust 
(Berkeley, CA: Evolver, 2012). 
7 Tim Bajarin, “This Will Be the Most Disruptive Technology over the Next Five Years,” Time, 
January 12, 2015, 1–3, http://time.com/3663909/technology-disruptive-impact/; Jeremy Heimans, “What 
New Power Looks Like,” TED video, 15:08, June 2014, https://www.ted.com/talks/jeremy_heimans_what_ 
new_power_looks_like?language=en; Clay Shirky, “How the Internet Will (One Day) Transform 
Government,” TED video, 18:32, June 2012, https://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_the_internet_ 
will_one_day_transform_government?language=en. 
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challenges to come. This chapter begins with a brief look at the development and 
evolution of these technologies, starting with the difference between traditional 
technologies and Radical Leveling Technology (RLT). The five core questions that drove 
this thesis are introduced, along with the case-study methodology. The chapter concludes 
with an overview of the remaining chapters. While the intent of this thesis is to provide a 
starting point for understanding RLT and some initial options to prevent dangerous use of 
such technology, it still aims to provide a broad perspective on RLT. Emphasis is placed 
on the need to develop in-depth expertise on RLT in order to construct a strategy to 
address the challenges posed by this technology class. Policy and regulation in this area, 
if done ignorantly and in a reactive fashion, will function to make the state and the public 
less secure. Some of this damage may have effects from which there is no option for 
recovery. The brave new world of nascent RLT may be forgiving now, but in a few years, 
the security landscape is going to change dramatically. At that point, if policymakers are 
not ready to face these challenges, the state will suffer diplomatically, militarily, and 
economically. This thesis is the first step on the path to preventing that from happening. 
A. RISE OF THE RLT: EXPONENTIAL VS. LINEAR TECHNOLOGY 
When Martin Cooper, an engineer working for Motorola, made a call on the first 
cell phone in 1973, no one could have predicted the evolution that was to follow.8 Much 
like the personal computer, the cell phone evolved slowly for ten years before the first 
handheld became commercially available, and then it was another ten years before this 
technology was accessible to the general public. If Martin back in 1973 had announced 
that in forty years cell phones would become smartphones on which text messages and 
emails could be sent and photos and videos could be shared, that people would be able to 
shop and bank from these devices, unlock their cars, play music, or even remotely set the 
temperatures on their thermostats, many would have dismissed this as sheer fantasy, the 
stuff of science fiction. Certainly no one foresaw cell phones being used as triggers for 
                                                 
8 Nicole Nguyen, “The Evolution of the Cell Phone—How Far It’s Come!” ReadWrite, July 4, 2014, 
http://readwrite.com/2014/07/04/cell-phone-evolution-popsugar. 
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explosive devices or as tools for identity theft. And yet not only does this technology 
exist but it continues to evolve and shape communications culture and technology.9 
The evolutions of the cell phone, the personal computer, video game consoles, 
eight-track tapes to CD, and VCR to Blu-ray player are all disruptions. However, while 
these technologies enhanced aspects of society, their primary impacts were in the areas 
they were designed for—communications, audio/visual applications, entertainment, or 
information technology. They only served to disrupt and replace the technology within 
those defined spaces. This process is what many have come to expect as normal for 
technological evolutions: predominately linear, with perhaps a few branches (e.g., tablet 
devices, touchscreens, and digital readers or the addition of video and photography 
capabilities to our handheld devices) and a few unexpected developments (e.g., 
branchless banking, geolocation capabilities, and bomb making) that still fall 
predominately within existing legal and regulatory parameters. But this predictable 
pattern of technological evolution has started to change in a big way. 
Today, a new species of emerging technologies is looming. Born of the Internet, 
maintaining one foot in cyber with the ability to manifest physical impacts, both 
disruptive and transformative, to multiple technologies as well as existing societal 
processes and with the ability to provide non-state actors with technology that can enable 
them to rival nation-state power, RLT present a raw challenge, one that will require a 
new approach to national security policy and regulatory efforts. 
  
                                                 
9 Alexander Trowbridge, “Evolution of the Phone: From the First Call to the Next Frontier,” CBS 
News, December 6, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/evolution-of-the-phone-from-the-first-call-to-the-
next-frontier/. 
 6 
Figure 1.  Additive Manufacturing: An 




Due to the persistent innovation enabled by the Internet, non-state actors are 
gaining access to technologies that allow them to achieve parity at the state and regional 
governance levels. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic State are able to use 
technology as non-state actors to exploit the Westphalian state-centric system to their 
advantage. These technologies are changing the balance of power, creating a world in 
which a small group can address heads of state or a group such as Hezbollah can leverage 
technology to militarily compete with Israel.10 As technological development continues 
                                                 
10 Emily O. Goldman and Leo J. Blanken, “The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” in Guns 
and Butter: The Political Economy of International Security, ed. Peter Dombroski. (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2005), 37; Daniel Siryoti, “Iran Admits Hezbollah’s Drone over Israel Used Iranian Technology,” 
Associated Press, October 14, 2012, http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=6075; 
Yochi Dreazen, “The Next Arab-Israeli War Will Be Fought with Drones,” Diplomat, March 26 2014; 
Marc Goodman and Parag Khanna, “The Power of Moore’s Law in a World of Geotechnology,” National 
Interest no. 123 (January-February 2013): 64–73; Amy Zegart, “The Coming Revolution of Drone 
Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/amy-zegart-the-coming-
revolution-of-drone-warfare-1426720364. 
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rapidly, it is imperative that nation-states and international security organizations devise 
effective legal and regulatory responses to address the changing balance of power and the 
potential for proliferation of advanced, hard to detect, easy to produce, easy to proliferate 
threat technologies that can create national or regional impacts.11 
This thesis will explore RLT and then conduct a qualitative analysis on one 
example: additive manufacturing (commonly referred to as 3D printing). AM was chosen 
due to its accessibility, familiarity among the public and because it is currently center 
stage in several policy and regulatory discussions. The reader will be exposed to the 
unique security challenges posed by RLT and shown a comparative case-study review 
that highlights both successful and failed tactics in dealing with specific aspects of these 
technologies. Discussion of a flexible spectrum of solutions that can be employed and 
evolved to address current and future RLT will be included. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Upon completion of an initial literature review, five key research questions were 
identified as core to the discussion on RLT. The first two are concerned with how non-
state actors and rogue states may seek to leverage RLT and the degree to which they 
might gain nuclear parity with nation-states. More specifically, this section focuses on 
understanding the capabilities and limitations of these technologies within the security 
and law-enforcement arenas. The third question concerns the possible ways for the US 
government and its allies to receive advance warning of potential threats to civilian 
international security, examining the need to understand the culture driving these 
                                                 
11 W. McLaughlin, “The Use of the Internet for Political Action by Non-State Dissident Actors in the 
Middle East,” First Monday 8, no. 11 (November 2003), doi: 10.5210/fm.v8i11.1096; Conner M. McNulty, 
Neyla Arnas, and Thomas Campbell, “Toward the Printed World: Additive Manufacturing and 
Implications for National Security,” Defense Horizons, no. 73 (September 2012): 1–16; Gerald Walther, 
“Printing Insecurity? The Security Implications of 3D-Printing of Weapons,” Science and Engineering 
Ethics (December 2014): 1–11, doi: 10.1007/s11948-014-9617-x; Jillian York, “EFF Signs Joint Coalition 
Letter Urging Companies to be Proactive on Export Regulations,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 27, 
2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/eff-signs-joint-coalition-letter-urging-companies-be-
proactive-export-regulations; Nick Thorpe, “Hungary Internet Tax Cancelled after Mass Protests,” BBC 
News, October, 31, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29846285?print=true; Zeynep Tufekci 
and Christopher Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations 
from Tahrir Square,” Journal of Communication 62, no. 2 (April 2012): 363–79, doi: 10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2012.01629.x; US Department of State, “Controls Tangible/Intangible,” accessed January 8, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/practices/c43180.htm. 
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technologies as well as effective alternatives that will aid in addressing informational 
gaps. The final two questions look at the degree to which RLT may be susceptible to law 
enforcement and regulation and the need to balance security against potential benefits 
such technology may bring to societies. This discussion seeks to establish a foundational 
framework from which the law enforcement and national security communities can stay 
current on evolutions in RLT and ensure that government efforts are not outpaced by 
future evolutions. 
D. APPROACH 
This thesis focuses on AM as an example of the many RLT developing from the 
open-source innovation of the Internet today. The selection of AM was appropriate 
because it is the most publicly familiar and the most easily translated. In addition, AM 
displays all of the features of a typical RLT including a radically transformative, 
disruptive nature that will usher in the next generation of existing technologies and 
societal processes.  
Since AM and other RLT have just recently come to the forefront of public 
consciousness, the body of knowledge on how to approach security concerns and 
regulation within the digital environment is still fairly immature. A series of cross-
sectional case studies representative of failed and successful interactions between 
government, corporate, and regulatory entities and the online OSCs that are the drivers 
behind the majority of RLT will be examined to glean the necessary characteristics for a 
successful spectrum of solutions that policymakers and regulators can apply to current 
and future RLT. This foundation should provide an approach that can then be evolved in 
 9 
tandem with technological changes to control diffusion and deter the development of 
technological threat vectors useful to non-state actors and rogue states.12 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters, beginning with the definition of the 
RLT species and ending with recommendations on a way forward. The second chapter 
introduces RLT and AM and shows the tremendous potential these new technologies hold 
for the future, as well as the role of online Open Source Communities as drivers. Chapter 
III discusses the associated challenges that will need to be confronted by the government, 
military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities both at national and 
international levels. Chapter IV will provide perspective via a comparative case-study 
review of successful and unsuccessful efforts to address these technologies as well as an 
overview of the online culture that is a critical piece in designing a suitable spectrum of 
options. Finally, Chapter V will make recommendations to address the changing strategic 
environment. This will include baseline options that can be used by policymakers and 
regulatory entities as a starting point to address current security concerns. These options 
are intended to be flexible enough to grow with and address future iterations of 
technological evolution. 
  
                                                 
12 Siryoti, “Iran Admits Hezbollah’s Drone”; Dreazen, “Next Arab-Israeli War,” 1–5; Goodman and 
Khanna, “Power of Moore’s Law,” 64–73; Hanno Charisius, Richard Friebe, and Sascha Karberg, 
“Becoming Biohackers: The Long Arm of the Law,” BBC, January 24, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/future/ 
story/20130124-biohacking-fear-and-the-fbi; Devan R. Desai and Gerard N. Magliocca, “Patents, Meet 
Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things,” Georgetown Law Journal 102, no. 6 (April 2014): 
1691–720; Ian Paul, “‘Disarming Corruptor’ Disguises 3D Printing Designs to Fight the Man,” PCWorld, 
November 5, 2013, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2060822/disarming-corruptor-disguises-3d-printing-
designs-to-fight-the-man.html; Kyle Soska and Nicolas Christin, “Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of 
the Online Anonymous Marketplace Ecosystem,” paper presented at the Proceedings of the 24th USENIX 
Security Symposium, Washington, DC, August 12–14, 2015; Joseph C. Storch, “3-D Printing Your Way 
Down the Garden Path: 3-D Printers, the Copyrightization of Patents, and a Method for Manufacturers to 
Avoid the Entertainment Industry’s Fate,” New York University Journal of Intellectual Property & 
Entertainment Law 34, no. 2 (spring 2014): 249–309; Ryan Whitwam, “US State Department Begins the 
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II. DEFINING THE RLT 
Remember, science fiction’s always been the kind of first-level alert to 
think about things to come. It’s easier for an audience to take warnings 
from sci-fi without feeling that we’re preaching to them. Every science 
fiction movie I have ever seen, any one that’s worth its weight in celluloid, 
warns us about things that ultimately come true. 
Steven Spielberg 
 
The science fiction on screen today is in some cases only mere steps ahead of 
reality. Ironman’s JARVIS interface is an advanced form of 3D printing coupled with 
cloud computing and some artificial intelligence thrown in for good measure. While 
Ironman is fictional, Hollywood’s Legacy Effects did such a good job with the 3D 
printing of Ironman’s movie suit that the US military has contacted them to assist with 
the development of the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit, or TALOS project.13 Many 
of the science-fiction storylines playing out in popular culture today are also progressing 
rapidly as science fact in the form of RLT. 
The focus of this chapter will be on RLT, understanding what they are, how they 
are defined, and why these technologies are different from other disruptive technologies 
like the cell phone. AM provides a ready example of this family of technologies as well 
as ample options to demonstrate the effects that can be brought to bear by an individual 
technology or when multiple RLT are combined. The chapter will finish with a 
discussion of online Open Source Communities (OSCs) as vehicles and drivers of these 
game-changing technologies and the role cyberspace will play in their continued 
development and evolution, before moving on to Chapter III, a discussion of threat 
vectors. 
                                                 
13 Peter Bright, “HP’s Spout PC is Like a Real Version of Ironman’s JARVIS,” ARS Technica, 
October 29, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/10/hps-sprout-pc-is-like-a-real-version-of-iron-
mans-jarvis/; Michael Molitch-Hou, “5 Pairs of 3D Printed Shoes You’ll See at Milan Design Week 2015.” 
3D Printing Industry, April 14, 2015, 1–5, http://3dprintingindustry.com/2015/04/14/5-pairs-of-3d-printed-
shoes-youll-see-at-milan-design-week-2015/. 
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A. RLT DEFINED: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLASS 
Defining RLT helps to bound the problem set and clarify key characteristics that 
must be considered when reflecting on potential spectrum solutions and formulating 
future policy concerning such technology.  
A Radical Leveling Technology can be told from other disruptive linear 
technologies by the following defining characteristics: 
 Anchored in the Internet whether by collaborative, developmental, or 
operational necessity which is core to its function and/or application 
 When applied, has the effect of broad decentralization in the areas of 
power, economy, or information control at the nation-state level but can 
finely focus power and information at the individual or non-state-actor 
level 
 Is driven in part or in whole by the strength and innovation of online OSCs 
 Has a transformative and disruptive nature not just within its initial sphere 
of influence but across a wide range of cultural and societal processes14 
 Has the ability, when mature, to result in a generational leap (forward or 
backward) that will impact global populations15 
This class of technologies includes AM, quantum computing and cloud 
computing, nanotechnology, the block chain algorithm underlying the development of 
cryptocurrencies, advanced genetics, neurotechnology, synthetic biology, programmable 
materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, and of course the Internet, from 
which all of the above derive.16 
                                                 
14 James Manyika et al., “Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and 
the Global Economy,” McKinsey & Company, May 2013, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_ 
technology/disruptive_technologies; Bill Briggs and Marcus Shingles, “Exponentials,” Deloitte University 
Press, January 29, 2015, http://dupress.com/articles/tech-trends-2015-exponential-technologies/?id= 
us:2el:3dc:dup1012:eng:cons:tt15; John Hagel III et al., “From Exponential Technologies to Exponential 
Innovation: Report 2 of the 2013 Shift Index Series,” Deloitte University Press, October 4, 2013, 1–51, 
http://dupress.com/articles/from-exponential-technologies-to-exponential-innovation/. 
15 Here, a generation is defined based on the generation-time equations utilized by population 
biologists to predict the average time between two consecutive generations. For humans, this is around 
twenty years. Many organizations also identify generations by title, such as the “veteran generation” or 
“traditionalists,” 1925–45, the “baby boomers,” 1945–65, and “generation X,” 1965–85. Additional 
information and equations can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generation_time or 
http://www.marketingteacher.com/the-six-living-generations-in-america/. 
16 Bajarin, “Most Disruptive Technology,” 1–3. 
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RLT are different from mainstream technologies in that they pose a unique 
evolutionary challenge. Typically, a disruptive technology will emerge, evolve, and 
replace a specific pre-existing technology within a defined economic space such as the 
digital camera replacing film cameras or the smart phone replacing the cell phone.17 
There will also be some impact to societal processes and a few unexpected outgrowths 
from the disruption, but at a manageable level. RLT, however, mimic the fluidly 
disruptive nature of the Internet. Instead of disrupting a single specific marketplace or 
technology, they have the ability to disrupt and transform a wide range of processes and 
technologies while also significantly impacting society and culture. In a sense, RLT 
operate within a rapidly expanding space whose borders are constantly changing, making 
it difficult to anticipate and manage materializing effects. 
B. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING: THE EVOLUTION OF AN RLT 
Three-dimensional printing, initially developed as “stereolithography” in 1984 by 
Chuck Hull of 3D Systems, was created to provide manufacturers with an affordable, 
rapid prototyping capability for one-off designs. The strength of AM lies in its ability to 
infinitely evolve digital designs and then physically manifest these items for public use. 
This technology, once limited to industry, became available for hobby use and hit the 
mainstream in 2005.18 While AM was initially seen as a fad, the last ten years have made 
it apparent that this RLT is both transformative and disruptive in nature. A transformative 
technology is one that has the ability to change the nature or structure of how a process 
occurs. Experts such as Chris Anderson, Christopher Barnatt, Terry Wohlers, Peter 
Singer, James Canton, Toby Redshaw, and Marc Goodwin all share the opinion that AM 
                                                 
17 Kyriakos Pierrakakis et al., “3D Printing and Its Regulation Dynamics: The World in Front of a 
Paradigm Shift,” paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Information 
Law and Ethics, Thessaloniki, Greece, May 30–31, 2014. 
18 Chuck Hull, “Pioneer in Stereolithography,” SPIE Professional, January 15, 2013. 
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will have transformative effects across a broad spectrum of areas.19 AM has also been 
termed a disruptive technology by these experts, and this is the more important aspect to 
grasp.20 A disruptive technology will not only replace a previous technology but will 
evolve technology to a more advanced level or have a “groundbreaking” impact. This can 
be seen in technologies like the cell phone or the development of wireless 
communications. But unlike the cell phone, AM will not disrupt only one technology or 
one area; AM has the potential to disrupt multiple technologies and areas across society, 
replace them, and then continue to evolve. This is apparent in how the technology is 
advanced and employed and the impact it has on societal processes (e.g., evolving or 
replacing logistics structures or producing disruptive business models).21 
There are numerous illustrations of how this RLT is causing generational leaps in 
various disparate fields. In 2015, AM disrupted the medical field with the first 3D-printed 
skull replacements, the development of 3D bioprinted capillaries and 3D-printed liver 
                                                 
19 Chris Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2012); Terry 
Wohlers and Tim Caffrey, “Wohlers Report 2015: 3D Printing and Additive Manufacturing State of the 
Industry Annual Worldwide Progress Report,” Wohlers Associates, 2015; Christopher Barnatt, 3D 
Printing: The Next Industrial Revolution (N.p.: ExplainingTheFuture.com, 2013); Goodman, “Crime Has 
Gone High-Tech”; Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable, and 
What We Can Do about It (New York: Doubleday, 2015); Goodman and Khanna, “Power of Moore’s 
Law,” 64–73; Agence France-Presse, “3D Printing Could Revolutionize War and Foreign Policy,” Space 
Daily, January 5, 2015, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/How_3D_printing_could_revolutionise_war_ 
and_foreign_policy_999.html; James Canton, Toby Redshaw, and Rudy Burger, “New Frontiers in 
Emerging and Disruptive Technology: Where to Look for Innovation and Competition - and Where Not to 
Look,” Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 27, 2015. 
20 Wohlers and Caffrey, “Wohlers Report 2015”; Anderson, Makers: New Industrial Revolution; 
Agence France-Presse, “3D Printing Could Revolutionize War”; Barnatt, 3D Printing: Next Industrial 
Revolution; Daniel Cohen, Matthew Sargeant, and Ken Somers, “3-D Printing Takes Shape,” McKinsey & 
Company, January 2014; Louis Columbus, “2015 Roundup of 3D Printing Market Forecasts and 
Estimates,” Forbes, March 31, 2015, 1–12; Helena Dodziuk, “What’s New in 3D Printing?” ChemViews, 
February 12, 2014, doi: 10.1002/chemv.201300064; Pierrakakis et al., “3D Printing and its Regulation 
Dynamics”; Brian Proffitt, “How Open Source Hardware Is Driving the 3D-Printing Industry,” ReadWrite, 
July 3, 2012, 1–3, http://readwrite.com/2012/07/03/how-open-source-hardware-is-driving-the-3d-printing-
industry; John Pugh, “Vaccines Built on A 3D Printer,” PSFK, November 11, 2012, http://www.psfk.com/ 
2012/11/build-vaccines-3d-printer.html. 
21 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (Abingdon, UK: 
Frank Cass, 2004); Anderson, Makers: New Industrial Revolution; Pete Basiliere, “3D Printing Predictions 
for 2013,” www.3ders.org, December 30, 2012, http://www.3ders.org/articles/20121229-3d-printing-
predictions-for-2013.html; Clayton Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation,” Clayton Christensen website, 
accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/; Manyika et al., “Disruptive 
Technologies”; Amit Chowdhry, “What Can 3D Printing do? Here Are Six Creative Examples,” Forbes, 
October 8, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2013/10/08/what-can-3d-printing-do-here-
are-6-creative-examples/. 
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tissue, and the development of 3D-printed skin transplants using cells cultured from 
patients.22 Local Motors 3D printed a new vehicle, the Rally Fighter, that consumers can 
customize and build themselves. Several other examples of 3D-printed autos, from 
Forecast 3D to the Oak Ridge National Lab and in countries like China, are now hitting 
the market.23 Printed drones, airplane parts, houses, fashion, biological-based robots, and 
weapons are just part of the torrent impacting the marketplace and society. The 
convergence of AM, existing technologies, and unrestricted creativity has resulted in a 
revolution that will have far-reaching effects and will create sweeping cultural changes.24 
The below graphic from the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) report entitled 3D 
Printing and the Future of Manufacturing details just a few of the areas that are being 
revolutionized by AM.25 
  
                                                 
22 “Summarized: The 3D-printing Medical Achievements of the Past Year,” Mistbreaker News, 
January 3, 2015, http://www.mistbreaker.com/medicine-biotech/summarized-3d-printing-medical-
achievements-past-year/. 
23 “Local Motors Rally Fighter,” Local Motors, accessed May 5, 2015, https://shop.localmotors.com/ 
products/local-motors-rally-fighter; Whitney Hipolite, “Chinese Company 3D Prints a Full-Size Working 
Car for Just $1770,” 3DPrint.com, March 25, 2015, http://3dprint.com/53532/chinese-3d-printed-car/; 
Eddie Krassenstein, “Forecast 3D to Show off This Racecar, Featuring 45 3D Printed Parts at RAPID 
Event Next Week,” 3DPrint.com, May 13, 2015, http://3dprint.com/65093/forcast-3d-printed-racecar/; 
David Szondy, “ORNL Unveils 3D-Printed Shelby Cobra in Detroit,” Gizmag, January 13, 2015, 
http://www.gizmag.com/3d-printed-shelby-cobra-ornl/35575/. 
24 Liz Ahlberg, “Muscle-Powered Bio-Bots Walk on Command,” University of Illinois News Bureau, 
June 13, 2014, https://news.illinois.edu/news/14/0630biobots2_rashidbashir.html; Adam Clarke Estes, “3D-
Printed Guns Are Only Getting Better and Scarier,” Gizmodo, January 6, 2015, http://gizmodo.com/3d-
printed-guns-are-only-getting-better-and-scarier-1677747439; Materialise, “3D Print Design Show NYC,” 
Meckler Media, accessed 5/5, 2015, http://www.3dprintdesignshow.com/; Rory Stott, “A Giant 3D Printer 
Builds Ten Houses in One Day,” Huffington Post, September 2, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/09/08/3d-printed-houses_n_5773408.html; Cody Wilson, “Ghost Gunner,” Defense Distributed, 
accessed May 5, 2015, https://ghostgunner.net/; Steve Doll, “Hovership: 3D Printed Racing Drone,” Make: 
44 (April-May 2015); Michael Molitch-Hou, “US Military Turns to Hollywood’s Legacy Effects to 3D 
Print Iron Man Suit,” 3D Printing Industry, July 9, 2014, http://3dprintingindustry.com/2014/07/09/us-
military-turns-hollywoods-legacy-effects-3d-print-iron-man-suit/; David Szondy, “GE Fires Up Fully 3D-
Printed Jet Engine,” Gizmag, May 13, 2015, http://www.gizmag.com/ge-fires-up-all-3d-printed-jet-
einge/37448/; Worstall, Tim. “Both GE and Rolls Royce are to use 3D Printing to make Jet Engines and 
Violate Engineering's Prime Commandment.” Forbes (2 December 2013, 2013): 1-2. 
25 Computer Sciences Corporation Leading Edge Forum, 3D Printing and the Future of 
Manufacturing (Falls Church, VA: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2012), http://assets1.csc.com/ 
innovation/downloads/LEF_20123DPrinting.pdf. 
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Figure 2.  3D Printing Impacts 
 
http://assets1.csc.com/innovation/downloads/LEF_20123DPrinting.pdf. 
The advancement of RLT has in many aspects been underappreciated by 
policymakers and regulators; much of what has been accomplished has not been at the 
forefront of discussion, even of industry discussions, until recently. This is because 1) 
RLT display an initial value perceived to be useful in a specific and limited manner; 2) 
the potential for innovation by an RLT is often misunderstood or obscured by 
institutional bias, which leads to an incorrect assessment of the capability (typical for 
disruptive technologies); and 3) the development and drive behind RLT is occurring via 
Open Source Communities. This is and will remain the biggest challenge. These 
innovations are occurring in a space that many governments and policymakers still are 
not fully comfortable with: cyberspace. And they are being driven by the power of OSCs, 
which are flexible, agile, transnational, and often anonymous. These groups come 
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together online to apply shared expertise to AM projects, resulting in rapid prototyping 
and fabrication of myriad new products and processes.26 
C. OPEN-SOURCE COMMUNITIES: DRIVERS OF EXPONENTIAL 
CHANGE 
In order to understand the role of cyberspace and OSCs in the development of 
RLT, it is necessary to understand the origins of OSCs. These groups began twenty-three 
years ago at Helsinki University with a student by the name of Linus Torvalds. At that 
time, the Internet was just beginning to grow. Unix, one of the operating systems of the 
time, was trying to survive as a software product. A series of battles ensued; Unix split 
into a number of proprietary software versions all fighting against each other to become 
the commercialized choice, and all of them were blindsided when a company called 
Microsoft introduced its new operating system, Windows. For the public, many of whom 
were just joining the Internet, the introduction of Windows made the process of 
connecting much easier. Those involved with Unix feared its utility had passed. Instead, 
Torvalds decided to develop his own free version of Unix called Linux. Linux is one of 
the major ripples that helped to create the tsunamis behind the power of OSCs today. 
When Torvalds released Linux online, he established the first open-source online 
community.27 
Most software developed at this time was created by a single programmer and 
released to the public to provide inputs or identify bugs so the company could fix them. 
In his splendid work on the history of open source entitled The Cathedral and the Bazaar, 
hacker28 Eric Raymond uses a classic analogy for what happened next. The typical 
approach to software development was top down, a centralized hierarchical process that 
                                                 
26 Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,” 
Harvard Business Review 73, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 43–53. 
27 Eric Raymond, The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental 
Revolutionary, 3rd ed. (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2001). 
28 The term hacker as used here is a positive term and refers to an online member who participates in 
the creation of tools and software in an effort to positively influence both scientific and social processes. In 
the case-studies section, the term hacker gang is used to refer to negative actors who choose to defy the 
cultural norms of online OSCs and conduct illicit activities against public, private, corporate, or 
government entities. 
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Raymond categorizes as the building of a cathedral. This was done by an individual or 
small team and kept in house by the company until the software was ready for release. 
Torvalds turned this process on its head. Instead of choosing to follow the cathedral 
approach, he released his new code online and invited the masses to get involved in its 
development. As more and more people began to participate in the project, Torvalds 
continued to solicit input, provide updates, and delegate responsibility for specific 
portions of the project to smaller groups or individuals working on their own in a 
decentralized manner. These groups would then add their work back into the code 
whenever they wanted. To Raymond, the developing Linux community looked like a 
diverse, bustling bazaar. Brooks’s law, a constant in the commercial-software-
development community, implies that this type of approach should not work because 
communications are a significant factor. The law states, “Adding more programmers to a 
late project makes it later.” This is because the work isn’t easily shared, due to its 
technical nature. New programmers take time to train, causing a lapse in productivity as 
the experienced programmers turn their attention away from the product to help bring 
their peers up to speed. In theory, Torvalds’s approach should have failed. Instead, Linux 
became one of the most successful operating systems in existence.29 
Raymond postulates in his book that this may be due to something sociologists 
refer to as the Delphi effect or the Delphi method. The terms refer to the employment of 
structured communications in such a way as to allow a group of individuals to work 
collaboratively at the same time on problems of varying complexity.30 In 2002, Murray 
Turoff and Harold Linstone produced a 618-page tome on the Delphi method examining 
its use across various group-problem-solving situations. Unsurprisingly, Delphi seemed 
to be a natural fit for organizations operating in cyberspace. Turoff and Linstone call this 
“real-time Delphi,” where costs of operations are limited to the price of a computer and 
the use of the infrastructure that communications flow across.31 The defining 
                                                 
29 Raymond, Cathedral & the Bazaar. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Harold A. Linstone, and Murray Turoff, eds., The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications. 
(Information Systems Department, New Jersey Institute of Technology, 2002), http://is.njit.edu/pubs/ 
delphibook 
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characteristics of real-time Delphi include equal flow of information to and from all 
members at all times, improved efficiency, and the ability to limit psychological effects 
(observables like social class, ethnicity, language, or schooling which in some cases may 
interfere with individual participation in groups) due to anonymity and the establishment 
of open forums to air disagreements or argue critical points. This process is characteristic 
of OSCs operating today. The public is probably most familiar with this process in the 
form of “crowdsourcing,” seen on startup websites like Kickstarter, or from social media 
events.32 
OSCs have at their core a very effective decentralized structure. This structure 
allows for simultaneous sharing of information by hundreds to thousands of contributors 
while also providing the opportunity for feedback. Individuals also have the power to 
significantly influence the direction of the OSC through forums. Individual inputs are 
offered a certain degree of anonymity within the group, which increases participation. 
Individuals volunteer to work on specific portions of a problem and are selected based on 
their skills as well as their desires. The leader of any OSC is the person who first presents 
the problem to the masses and requests their assistance; however, the term leader must be 
viewed very loosely when discussing OSCs. A leader in this environment is really just a 
coordinator, someone who gives the group a goal and then enables the work. In some 
cases, this may also be a loose core group. It is interesting to note that these individuals 
are not necessary to the OSC’s success. Individuals in a leadership function could be 
offline for a day or a year. It does not matter; the rest of the community will remain 
mobilized and continue to press forward on a solution. This is how the Internet expanded 
and continues to grow today. This is also why OSCs are able to rapidly mass and operate 
at net speed to solve problems in cyber- and physical spaces with very little command or 
control.33 
OSCs began to expand following the opening of the Internet to the public in 1994. 
People formed online communities to conduct research, create models, perform planning 
functions, and develop transnational relationships in near-real or real time. For the first 
                                                 
32 Linstone and Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications. 
33 Raymond, Cathedral & the Bazaar. 
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time in history, a group of two to ten thousand could assemble virtually, share 
information, discuss and debate, and then take that information in any direction that was 
useful to their goal. All of these interactions occur regularly without a centralized 
command and control structure, and the results are inarguably amazing. Hackers are 
developing open-source software at lightening speeds. Activists are able to quickly 
mobilize populations. And makers are able to take physical products, render them 
digitally, and then replicate and evolve them without limit.34 
AM has a variety of capabilities, but the most influential are digital design and the 
3D printer. Originally created to print physical items using the additive layering of 
plastics, 3D printers today can print in polymers, carbon fiber, and multiple types of 
metals and alloys, as well as graphene, chocolate, wood-based filaments, cements, and 
even living cells and tissue. This means that a machine can extrude (or sinter, for metal-
based projects) materials onto a build table to produce an item in one solid piece without 
the need for subtractive methods like milling or machining. General Electric and Rolls 
Royce are using 3D printers to produce complex items like aircraft engines, which 
contain eighty-seven nozzles that can now be printed as a single structure. These printers 
allow complex items to be designed and produced as one piece without worry of welds 
failing or parts dropping off. This also makes the designs lighter, saves on materials, and 
improves efficiency by allowing for automated production around the clock by 
networked 3D printers.35 
The iconic example of AM technology fusion can be found at the Tesla Factory in 
Fremont, CA. Unlike typical automotive manufacturing facilities this state-of-the-art 
facility is able to custom build a series of cars across a twenty-four-hour period without 
having to change out the line. This is done by combining advanced robotics with 3D 
                                                 
34 A maker is an individual involved in the 3D-printing revolution, which allows participants to 
modify existing technologies and evolve them to their own specific requirements, then print them using 
plastic, polymers, or metal. Anderson, Makers: New Industrial Revolution; Barnatt, 3D Printing: Next 
Industrial Revolution; Basiliere, “3D Printing Predictions for 2013”; Micah L. Sifry, “The Rise of Open-
Source Politics,” Nation, November 4, 2004, http://www.thenation.com/article/rise-open-source-politics/; 
Thorpe, “Internet Tax Cancelled.” 
35 Szondy, David. "GE Fires up Fully 3D-Printed Jet Engine." Gizmag (13 MAY 2015, 2015): 
5/5/2015-4. Worstall, Tim. "Both GE and Rolls Royce are to use 3D Printing to make Jet Engines and 
Violate Engineering's Prime Commandment." Forbes (2 December 2013, 2013): 1-2. 
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printers and programming them to meet variable manufacturing requirements. The plant 
can also be reprogrammed in minutes to produce anything from computers to parts for the 
International Space Station. AM has few limitations that an imaginative mind with the 
right materials cannot overcome.36 
Once an item is captured digitally, it can be shared and evolved infinitely. Much 
of the software is open source, and it is not necessary to own a personal 3D printer 
(although one can build a basic printer for as little as $600 or an updated printer for 
$1,100, courtesy of YouTube).37 If a design is ready to print, maker software allows users 
to link to an online production site, select production options, pay for the work, and wait 
for it to ship to their location. The ability to produce specialty items (including items that 
couldn’t be produced before AM existed), small runs, and rapid prototypes are all 
strengths for this movement.38 
In 2011, 3D printers gained in popularity as the public was exposed to Maker 
Faires, hackerspaces, and fab labs where technology was openly demonstrated and hands-
on participation was welcomed.39 By 2013, the first 3D-printed plastic gun had resulted 
in widespread media attention and a significant upswing in the numbers of both hobbyist 
and professional 3D-printer systems purchased worldwide.40 In 2014, China printed ten 
houses in one day using cement and recycled construction materials, the Local Motors 
Strati car was printed in just forty-four hours in the U.S., and Solid Concepts started 
                                                 
36 Freedonia Group, “Industry Study Report by the Freedonia Group: Global Demand for 3D Printing 
to Rise Over 20% Annually through 2017,” 3D Printer Technology Forum, 2014; Anderson, Makers: New 
Industrial Revolution. 
37 Go here on YouTube to view videos of the home-built printer: Printer #1 Basic 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46eq9fxaEds; Printer #2 Updated https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
u5azTt2nSZc. 
38 Anderson, Makers: New Industrial Revolution; Barnatt, 3D Printing: Next Industrial Revolution; 
Basiliere, “3D Printing Predictions for 2013.” 
39 Hackerspaces and fab labs are just two of the many public open manufacturing forums appearing 
across cities worldwide to teach people how to do AM and use the various associated tools and software. 
40 Simon Muphy and Russell Myers, “How Mail on Sunday ‘Printed’ First Plastic Gun in UK Using a 
3D Printer and Then Took It on Board Eurostar without Being Stopped in Security Scandal,” Daily Mail, 
May 11, 2013. 
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selling 3D-printed metal guns online.41 These stories have caught the attention of the 
media, but there is a much deeper phenomenon occurring here: the maker movement (and 
the OSCs central to it) are the engine of AM, making it extremely agile, aggressively 
adaptable, and unlimited in scalability.42 
One way to quantify the impact that OSCs are having on AM is to take a look at 
recent market predictions. Wohlers Associates, Inc., an independent consulting firm who 
has studied the 3D-printing industry for the last thirty years, has estimated that the 
industry will grow from $3 billion in revenue in 2013 to exceed $21 billion by 2020. 
Gartner projects global market growth to increase from $1.6 billion in 2015 to $13 billion 
by 2018. Siemens estimates that 3D printing will become 50% more affordable and the 
printing process will become up to 400% faster within five years.43 Accessibility, ease of 
use, and increased affordability will continue to escalate the adoption of AM by the 
public and industry.44 
For policymakers, RLT pose many challenges that require a thoughtful approach 
and that existing regulations and frameworks lack the flexibility to successfully address. 
Solutions will have to keep pace with RLT and hold up in a rapidly changing 
environment while still being enforceable. Such solutions cannot be conceived in a 
vacuum. Participation and expertise from OSCs and technology centers like Silicon 
Valley are an essential part of any policy or regulatory strategy dealing with RLT. 
Collaboration with these groups will enable government to respond to RLT effects not 
                                                 
41 Melissa Goldin, “Chinese Company Builds Houses Quickly with 3D Printing,” Mashable, April 29, 
2014, http://mashable.com/2014/04/28/3d-printing-houses-china/; John Biggs, “Solid Concepts Announces 
Another 3D-Printed Metal Gun,” TechCrunch, October 27, 2014, http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/27/solid-
concepts-announces-another-3d-printed-metal-gun/; Lance Ulanoff, “World’s First 3D Printed Car Took 
Years to Design, but Only 44 Hours to Print,” Mashable, September 16, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/ 
09/16/first-3d-printed-car/; Boyle, Rebecca. “How the First Crowdsourced Military Vehicle Can Remake 
the Future of Defense Manufacturing.” Popular Science, June 30, 2011. 
http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2011-06/how-first-crowdsourced-military-car-can-remake-future-
defense-manufacturing. 
42 Germain, “Next on the Open Source Horizon,” 7; Proffitt, “Open Source Hardware Is Driving.” 
43 Columbus, “2015 Roundup of 3D Printing Market,” 1–12; Brent Balinski, “The 3D Printing Boom 
Continues,” Manufacturers’ Monthly, May 15, 2015, http://www.manmonthly.com.au/Features/The-3D-
printing-boom-continues. 
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addressed by current laws and to design new laws replacing ineffective policy. 
Understanding RLT, OSCs, and developing threat vectors will remain fundamental to the 
construction of a useful strategy for endgame success.45 
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III. CHALLENGES POSED BY RLT 
In the case of nuclear physics there was an iconic experience, the 
mushroom cloud, that made it clear to nuclear physicists that their work 
had security implications. There has been no comparable iconic 
experience for life scientists. 
Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
speaking on synthetic biology, dual-use life science research, 
and biosecurity, May 12, 2010 
The above quote is illustrative of many of the emerging technologies seen today. 
While it is impossible to predict all of the ways in which such technologies may be 
applied, it is possible via good multisource analysis to assess likely threat vectors. 
Policymakers, corporate leaders, governments, and the public will all need to have a 
realistic understanding of these technologies to successfully weigh potential risks while 
maximizing beneficial aspects. Reactive solutions will only exacerbate problem areas, so 
it is incredibly important to find thoughtful, realistic, educated solutions. In some cases, 
such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology, there are still a 
few years to proactively prepare to meet these challenges. Yet the challenges of 
technologies like AM and synthetic biology are already present and must be addressed 
now.46 
This chapter will examine enabling factors that can lead to the development of 
RLT threat vectors. Asia, as a critical center for AM advancement, is used to highlight 
RLT-related counterproliferation challenges. The following examples demonstrate how 
the effects of RLT, technology convergence, down-skilling, accessibility, and new 
models of production and manufacturing are increasing the complexity of the 
counterproliferation space. The chapter concludes with a look at the need for proactive 
solutions and the importance of online-community and private-sector partners in getting 
the next generation of security solutions right. 
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A. ENABLING FACTORS 
The first step in understanding the risk, aside from establishing actor intent, is to 
identify enabling factors and the potential threat vectors that may follow. For RLT, one of 
the more important enabling factors is down-skilling, the process of reducing the level of 
technical expertise or complexity of use required for successful employment, thereby 
improving the accessibility of a particular technology and increasing the likelihood of 
digital diffusion and mass use. Other enabling factors that aid in the development of 
threat vectors are ineffective or unenforceable regulations, low or no infrastructure 
requirements, and anonymizing tools. These factors serve to increase risk by reducing 
intelligence signatures, decreasing operational footprints, and masking malicious actors 
and actions, which can result in the establishment of cyber safe havens.47 
RLT will require an agility and autonomy that do not come naturally to any 
nation-state government. This necessitates a dedicated effort to retool military, 
diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and associated policy and regulatory 
apparatuses to provide a balanced capacity that can excel equally in traditional 
conventional environments and asymmetric or hybrid threat situations. This issue was 
highlighted at a panel discussion by the Expert Advisory Group on Strategic Latency. Dr. 
James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, illustrated how 
failure to adopt a balanced approach can turn an effective tactic into a losing 
methodology. He used the example of the America’s system of weapons, which is 
focused on two things: decapitation and kinetic effects. In this, the US is exceedingly 
effective, but where these tactics fail time and again is in asymmetric environments. 
Here, the key to success is weapons systems designed to match that irregular state, to 
achieve influence and gain the support of the target: the population. Dr. Canton’s point 
was that just because a tactic, technique, or procedure is effective in one set of 
circumstances does not mean that that same approach will be successful in another. The 
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tools must be specific to the requirement.48 As panel member Toby Redshaw, CEO of 
Kevington Advisors, noted, Kodak and Motorola refused to deviate from their winning 
tactics despite the fact that the digital camera and the smartphone presented a complete 
departure from existing technology and business models. Both of these corporate giants 
failed to adapt, and while not extinct, each company is a shadow of what it once was.49 
Apple and Steve Jobs, on the other hand, recognized changing circumstances and chose 
new tactics, removing internal roadblocks to change, eliminating institutional bias, and 
promoting adaptive innovation. This approach allowed Apple to make a comeback in 
both traditional and unconventional spaces. Apple was not afraid to step up and 
acknowledge that its tried-and-true tactics did not apply in this environment and a new 
approach was necessary.50 
 Forecasting is another challenge. Forecasting in intelligence often leads to 
unfulfilled expectations which are viewed as “intelligence failures.”51 In the case of RLT, 
the US needs to rapidly move away from longstanding practices and adapt to new 
structures that are successful in dealing with RLT and the decentralized, autonomous, 
flat, flexible organizations from which it derives. The US penchant for “keeping what 
works” will enable threat vectors, not prevent them.52 
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B. RLT THREAT VECTORS: THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME 
In the past, traditional threat vectors presented from known adversary states or, 
more recently, terror groups. With RLT, threats may emerge from these sources or from 
ignorant actors who misuse technology, resulting in new indigenous threats on the local 
level. Marketplace and social disruptions may also create unanticipated threat vectors, as 
the production and sale of unregulated products could lead to unintended health effects or 
long-term ecological impacts. A worst-case scenario would be the expansion of arms 
racing to non-state actors and developing nations as these entities seek to leverage RLT to 
achieve parity with national or regional actors.53  
These threat vectors have the ability to produce global effects. This is why the 
international community must come together on the RLT problem set. A collaborative 
approach will be necessary to maintain current power structures and provide a unified 
response to RLT events. 
At the Expert Advisory Group on Strategic Latency looking at “new challenges 
for strategic warning,” Dr. Canton, Rudy Burger the managing director of Woodside 
Capital Partners, Toby Redshaw, and Dr. James Giordano, a neurotechnologist and 
neuroethicist from Georgetown University, shared their perspective on competition and 
risk in the technology marketplace with an eye toward national security. They all echoed 
the same concerns: a need to restructure, to be proactive, to keep pace with innovation. 
Mr. Burger noted that the existing enemies of the US are following the path of venture 
capital and will continue to do so. His statements on non-state-actor use of drone warfare 
against Israel highlighted how RLT are lowering technical and economic thresholds, 
making previously inaccessible capabilities available to non-state actors.54 This area is 
further complicated by a lack of guidance and regulation. Dr. Giordano put this into 
context by explaining that approximately 60% of the research and development for 
neurotechnology is occurring in non-Western countries. These spaces are diverse, 
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regulation is inconsistent, and neurotechnology is advancing rapidly, yet it is still poorly 
understood by policymakers and regulators. Not all of these advancements are occurring 
within legal spaces, making the problems of safety and security more complex. Asia is a 
good example of how these factors are changing the proliferation environment.55 
C. ASIA, RLT, AND THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROBLEM 
Asia is one of the most dynamic and rapidly growing technology regions in the 
world.56 Home to some of the world’s busiest sea ports and a major producer of dual-use 
items, much of the Asian marketplace is under-regulated.57 The establishment of 
advanced infrastructure, cyber cities, high-speed Internet, and new trade zones has made 
the region increasingly accessible to both legitimate and illicit actors. In the next ten 
years, this region will experience significant growth in nuclear power and chemical and 
biotechnology industries. Coupled with RLT, this is a recipe for an extremely complex 
proliferation environment.58 
Asia has already had its share of proliferation challenges. In 2012, Filipino 
authorities detained an Iranian and an Austrian national for supplying dual-use goods to 
Iran’s nuclear program and defying multiple export-control regulations. Asia also played 
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a significant role in the highly publicized AQ Khan proliferation network.59 To date, the 
US Department of Justice Summary of Major US Export Enforcement, Economic 
Espionage, Trade Secret, and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases report has tracked 
multiple instances of Asian businesses facilitating the purchase and transshipment of 
goods and equipment to nations like Iran and North Korea for use in illicit weapons 
programs. Companies across Asia have conducted operations to gain access to controlled 
technologies in efforts to further develop nuclear, chemical, or biological programs or 
restricted weapons technologies like missiles, sonar, or aircraft upgrades.60 The belief 
that a lack of regulations addressing dual-use proliferation and illicit trade within Asian 
nations is the reason behind today’s proliferation challenge is only partly correct. The 
challenge, as illustrated in the following example, is much more complex.61 
D. WHEN PROLIFERATION GOES DIGITAL 
In April of 2015, Hannah Robert, owner of two New Jersey defense contracting 
businesses, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control 
Act. This crime is significant is because of how it was done. From 2010 to 2013, Robert 
transmitted export-controlled military drawings for the CH-47F Chinook helicopter to 
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India.62 The following excerpt from the Department of Justice report describes the 
process: 
Starting in October 2010, Robert transmitted the military drawings for 
these parts to India by posting the technical data to the password-protected 
website of a Camden County, NJ, church where she was a volunteer web 
administrator. This was done without the knowledge of the church staff. 
Robert emailed [her contact in India] R. P. the username and password to 
the church website so that R. P. could download the files from India. 
Through the course of the scheme, Robert uploaded thousands of technical 
drawings to the church website for R. P. to download in India. On June 25, 
2012, R. P. emailed Robert from India, stating in part: “Please send me the 
church web site username and password.” The email was in reference to 
both an invoice to, and a quote for, an individual known to Robert as a 
broker of defense hardware items for an end user in Pakistan. This 
individual (the “Pakistan trans-shipper”) employed a UAE address for 
shipping purposes.63 
Cases in which digital renderings replace physical shipments used to be rare, but 
this form of proliferation is now common practice. Cyberspace is a safe haven that 
circumvents the need for transshipment, face-to-face meetings, and forged papers. The 
Internet affords an added degree of anonymity, with easy transactions and access to rapid 
information sharing all in a dynamic, digital environment that is extremely difficult to 
regulate via traditional legal frameworks. RLT further complicate the issue. The ability to 
generate and evolve digital designs via digital scanning, 3D computer-aided design, and 
software that enables reverse engineering complicate the threat picture. Many of the 
factors that make AM a growing industry favorite, like its flexibility, small footprint, 
reduced material requirements, and nominal waste stream, also mean that covert weapons 
programs will be even harder to detect. The ability to fully automate 3D-printing 
processes further decreases activities and signatures used to identify malicious actors. 
Experts such as Dr. Bruce Goodwin, associate director at large for national security 
policy and research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, believe that the 
shrinking footprint of AM will challenge existing institutions. “The downside to all of 
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this is that it could dramatically increase [nuclear proliferation] and make it harder to 
detect,” Goodwin said at a recent American Physical Society meeting in San Antonio, 
Texas.64 
The ability to 3D print in multiple materials also increases the complexity of the 
problem set. It may be possible to download a build file from the Internet for nuclear 
parts and print them out using a metal 3D printer. Traditional production methods for 
such parts would take scores of welds and a full assembly line requiring several months 
of work. Soon it will be possible to produce controlled nuclear parts using proliferated 
build files.65 No longer is the problem of export control limited to the physical world. 
Digital build files used to guide 3D printers in the production of an object are widely 
available online, as is the necessary expertise. Illicit designs can be placed online in plain 
sight by using anonymizing software, such as Disarming Corruptor, which disguises the 
design as a regular object until an access code is entered to reveal its true nature. Dark 
Web proliferators are yet another wrinkle that will need to be considered. The possibility 
of non-state actors or rogue nations taking advantage of AM to produce restricted items 
such as nuclear weapons components and eventually the weapons themselves is a very 
real threat.66 
According to “Wohlers Report 2015,” roughly 27% of all industrial AM systems 
worldwide are currently located in Asia.67 The weapon of mass destruction (WMD)-
related threats posed to this area are growing precipitously. The increasing demand for 
WMD and associated technologies, the potential for nuclear arms racing as the US 
continues to draw down forces globally, and the failure to effectively engage Asian 
countries to encourage additional measures to regulate dual-use trade are all cause for 
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concern.68 To date, only Malaysia and Singapore have instituted legislation in this area. 
Instead of just worrying about Iran or North Korea, governments must now think about 
how non-state actors might take advantage of proliferation networks and RLT. Current 
legal and regulatory frameworks cannot address this new aspect of the problem. As such, 
most of these technologies have avoided the scrutiny and study required to assess their 
disruptive potential.69 
E. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND BIOHACKING: ENABLING 
EXPONENTIAL PROMISE, REGULATING EXPONENTIAL THREATS 
In 2013, a new technique for editing genes inside intact chromosomes was 
developed. Called clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats–associated 
protein-nine nuclease, or CRISPR/Cas9, this method used bacteria to destroy viruses by 
using RNA that matched the viral DNA sequence to cut out specific components, making 
the virus ineffective. In March 2015, a paper was released on how this process could 
retarget any gene via RNA modification. The problem? This method can set off a chain 
reaction that takes modified DNA and spreads it generation by generation throughout the 
entire species. The process is 97% effective at converting the next generation of genes 
and would continue until every generation had been modified.70 
Researchers were very concerned over the potential danger that this work could 
cause. As noted in their report: 
We are also keenly aware of the substantial risks associated with this 
highly invasive method, since the failure to take stringent precautions 
could lead to the unintentional release of [modified] organisms into the 
environment.71 
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Researchers ensured that the fruit flies used in the experiment were kept behind 
three layers of containment, all flies no longer necessary to the experiment were 
immediately killed, and all manipulations were performed on anesthetized flies in a 
Biosafety Level 2 facility. Harvard professor and synthetic biologist Dr. George Church, 
however, believes additional precautions need to be considered. Church has serious 
concerns about publishing this type of work due to the complications that could result 
from a modified organism being released inadvertently or purposefully into the wild. 
Synthetic biology in a properly controlled lab could reap great benefits for everyone; 
synthetic biology outside of a safe, regulated lab could be downright dangerous. There 
currently are no formal guidelines governing the above process or human genome 
modifications. This is the problem confronting law enforcement and policymakers tasked 
with ensuring safe, ethical science in the era of DIY biology and biohacking.72 
In 2012, artist Heather Dewey-Hagborg began attending a local Genspace, a 
public space where anyone can learn about biohacking, the art of reading and modifying 
DNA. Dewey-Hagborg wanted to find out how much she could learn from publically 
available DNA samples, so, using old gum and cigarette butts collected from her 
neighborhood, she isolated pieces of DNA that code for human facial features. Using a 
computer program, she reconstructed individual faces based on the DNA she had 
collected and 3D printed them for her Stranger Visions art display.73 Disturbed at how 
easy it would be for someone to violate individual genetic privacy, Dewey-Hagborg then 
created Invisible, a two-part spray system sold by BioGenFutures for $99 used to destroy 
trace DNA. The first spray, called Erase, uses a laboratory-grade sanitizer to remove 
99.5% of the trace DNA left by an individual, while the second spray, Replace, combines 
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with any remaining DNA and alters it by the addition of new genetic material. Forensic 
experts have expressed concern that widespread use of the spray could significantly 
complicate criminal investigations.74 
 In 2013, a San Francisco-based biohacker team used the project-fund site 
Kickstarter to raise money to market glow-in-the-dark plants. For a $40 donation, backers 
would receive their own packets of modified seeds. The plants were genetically 
engineered using genes from marine bacteria. The team used a computer program to 
create the modified DNA sequence online and then emailed the sequence to a company in 
China, who synthesized and shipped the final DNA to the biohacker team. A gene gun 
was used to insert the new DNA into the plant, causing it to glow. The total cost for this 
process: $8,000. The funds raised on Kickstarter: $500,000.75 A private technology 
watchdog, the ETC Group, notified the US Department of Agriculture about the project 
before the biohacked plants could be mailed to backers. The Department responded by 
informing ETC that they “were not equipped to regulate” this project. In the end, 
Kickstarter chose to ban the project, stating that “Projects cannot offer genetically 
modified organisms as a reward.”76 
While the majority of these groups operate under self-imposed ethical codes and 
safety protocols, there are still serious regulatory and ethical questions. Collaboratively 
working with these groups is one way to ensure that any unsafe projects are highlighted 
to law enforcement and stopped before they can pose a threat to the public. But even 
then, additional measures will be necessary. Yuriy Fazylov is a biohacker who has been 
working on genetically modifying plants so that they can survive in increased radiation 
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environments. He hopes that this will be a useful trait for space travel or for disaster 
regions recovering from nuclear accidents. While his idea is innovative and has truly 
beneficial applications, his approach may be less so when considering biosafety. When 
asked about safety, Fazylov replied, “My plan is to make it first and ask questions later.” 
Attitudes like this are not unusual and stem from a lack of education and information on 
the bigger picture. Bioterrorism threats could emerge from fringe groups drawing on 
knowledge from OSCs like the biohacker community, but they could just as easily evolve 
from an individual acting out of ignorance. 
F. UNDERSTANDING THE REGULATORY GAPS 
At this point, the picture should be clearer concerning the challenges presented by 
RLT to national and international security. The gaps in regulatory code and absence of 
authorities extend to the international community. A strong example is the UN’s 
Convention on Biological Diversity, which does address synthetic biology but has no 
teeth.77 Recently, the UN established the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Synthetic 
Biology and tasked them with responding to nine questions including defining and 
differentiating between living modified organisms and synthetic biological organisms, the 
adequacy of existing protocols for regulating synthetic biology, a comprehensive 
definition of what is and is not synthetic biology, and a full assessment of likely risks and 
benefits.78 
This is a prime example of just how big some of the gaps are with regard to 
understanding and dealing with RLT. Planning at just the regional or nation-state level 
will not be effective against these challenges, as they will derive from cyber-based 
transnational entities who won’t be responsive to traditional regulation designed for state-
to-state interactions. The risk governance required for RLT must be balanced. Too little 
regulation and the risks will dominate, too much regulation and the risks will anonymize 
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and go to ground, obscuring dangerous activities and making them more dangerous 
still.79 
President Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” is timely. According to a February 2015 
report by Global Industry Analysts, Inc., the synthetic biology industry is forecast to have 
a compound annual growth rate of 42% between 2015 and 2020 in the Asia-Pacific 
region.80 Areas like Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor and Singapore’s cyber city 
program will be conducive to rapid growth and innovation for RLT by providing 
unregulated or minimally regulated cyberspaces to work and play in. Singapore’s 
Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) cyber manifesto, now in its third iteration, 
highlights some strengths in its approach, including the promotion of security measures 
among individuals and businesses, comprehensive education and outreach programs, 
collaborative partnering with industry innovators, and most importantly an emphasis on 
information sharing. However, the focus is strictly on defensive measures against cyber-
based attacks, not the effects of RLT. To date, discussions on RLT have been few outside 
of the corporate world, leaving a dangerous blind spot in global security.81 
G. CONVERGENCE: THE EFFECTS OF EXPONENTIAL TECHNOLOGY 
SQUARED 
So far, this chapter has examined effects of individual RLT, but it is also 
important to understand the impact of combining two or more RLT. Convergence is 
central to understanding RLT effects. Three-dimensional bioprinting provides a ready 
example by showing what can happen when AM and synthetic biology are brought 
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together. While the effects of single RLT are exponential, a merger of these technologies 
can create effects that are much grander in scale.82 
Three-dimensional bioprinting is the process by which a modified 3D printer uses 
cells to build anything from skin or organ tissues to organs themselves. This market is 
moving forward at double the exponential rate thanks to the convergence of 3D 
bioprinting, robotics, and advanced genomics. New approaches in the field of biology 
have also helped enable this rapid development. For example, researchers now view 
biology not just as a science but also as an information technology. This new perspective 
has changed scientific processes into much faster information processes. Researchers can 
now use 3D bioprinters like the BioAssemblyBot (BAB) and its associated Tissue 
Structure Information Modeling (TSIM) program to scan cellular structure and organs, 
then import them into modeling programs for study or printing. Prior to this 
advancement, teams would spends weeks and months on coding and scripts just to be 
able to scan and model small features. What typically would take a team half a summer to 
do can now be accomplished in half a day.83 
Three-dimensional-printed skin for burn victims, synthetic vaccines, cells for drug 
testing, and organs all exist today. This is revolutionizing medicine and changing how 
illness and disease will be treated in the future. Viruses like Ebola and Marburg could be 
eradicated using targeted vaccines that incorporate CRISPR/Cas9 to stop the pathogen 
from replicating. The benefits RLT convergence will be tremendous for the quality of 
human health worldwide.84 
But as with all technologies, there is a dark side to consider as well. Dr. Jill 
Bellamy addresses one area on her website, Biological Warfare Blog: Black Six: 
                                                 
82 Briggs and Shingles, “Exponentials.” 
83 Gilpin, Lindsey and Jason Hiner. “New 3D Bioprinter to Reproduce Human Organs, Change the 
Face of Healthcare: The Inside Story.” TechRepublic, August 1, 2014. 
84 Jill Bellamy, “DARPA’s 7-Day Bio-Defence and the Future of Synthetic Vaccines,” Biological 
Warfare Blog: Black Six, January 4, 2015, http://bio-defencewarfareanalyst.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/darpas-
7-day-bio-defence-and-future-of.html; Craig J. Venter, “First Self-replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell,” J. 
Craig Venter Institute, accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.jcvi.org/cms/research/projects/first-self-
replicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell/overview/; Daniel G. Gibson et al., “Creation of a Bacterial Cell 
Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome,” Science 329, no. 5987 (July 2010): 52–56, doi: 
10.1126/science.1190719. 
 39 
What if the disease we are trying to prevent is unknown, synthetically 
derived, and possibly created in a clandestine warfare lab? As I’ve 
previously discussed, DARPA’s Blue Angel program and Medicago have 
successfully overcome the production lag-time issue for flu vaccine 
production; however, what would happen if a synthetic virus unknown at 
this point were able to be either accidentally or deliberately released? 
While I personally remain a strong proponent of synthetic biology, and 
political arguments aside, are we ready to treat, in a mass casualty context, 
synthetic illnesses?85 
Dr. Bellamy’s concerns are well founded. In 2005, a team of researchers was able 
to reconstruct the 1918 flu virus that was responsible for killing almost fifty million 
people globally, while in 2008, scientists used synthetic biology to recreate the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus by pretending to be involved in research on 
combatting infectious diseases. Both of these events took place in labs with 
professionally trained personnel, but RLT are lowering the technical requirements, are 
becoming more affordable and easier to use, and are supported by a web of online 
experts.86 The 2010 Homeland Security News Wire article “Day of Synthetic Pathogens-
Based Bio-Terrorism Nears” speaks to the seriousness of the problem when considering 
the malicious application of such technologies: 
“The problem is that now you can make DNA. For a number of these, you 
really don’t need to have access to the sample. The genomes of these 
pathogens are in publicly available databases,” said Jean Peccoud, an 
associate professor at the Virginia Bioinformatics Institute at Virginia 
Tech. “For a few thousand dollars you can get the Ebola genome.”87 
                                                 
85 Jill Bellamy, “Treating the Unthinkable: Vaccine Development for Unknown Synthetic Viruses,” 
Biological Warfare Blog: Black Six, May 19, 2014, http://bio-defencewarfareanalyst.blogspot.co.uk/ 
2014/05/treating-unthinkable-vaccine.html. 
86 Homeland Security News Wire, “Day of Synthetic Pathogens-Based Bioterrorism Nears,” 
September 16, 2010, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/day-synthetic-pathogens-based-
bioterrorism-nears; Jill Bellamy, “Emerging Technologies: Lowering the Threshold for ISIS (Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria) Mass Casualty Terrorism,” Biological Warfare Blog: Black Six, July 31, 2015, 
http://bio-defencewarfareanalyst.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/emerging-technologies-lowering.html. 
87 Homeland Security News Wire, “Synthetic Pathogens-Based Bioterrorism Nears.” 
 40 
Today, the Ebola genome can be freely downloaded from several websites for 
study or research, at school or at home.88 Companies like Organovo, Cambrian 
Genomics, Parabon NanoLabs, and Johnson & Johnson are using genomic data and 
combining it with bioprinting to create antitoxins, vaccines, designer genetics, printed 
skin, and tissue, as well as new regimes of pharmaceuticals in weeks, not years.89 
Meanwhile, individuals are 3D printing viruses to fight cancer, making targeted drugs to 
combat disease, and manipulating biological particles in ways that are providing 
incredible new insights into the human machine.90 On average, these technologies are 
doubling in capability every eight to twenty-four months, which means each technology 
will make capability advancements of a hundred to a hundred-thousand fold within the 
next ten years. For example, in just six years, the cost of genome sequencing went from 
$10 million down to a mere $1,000. In the eight months required to research and write 
this paper, each one of these technologies has advanced by a factor of five.91 These 
revolutions will disrupt industry, processes, society, and most importantly warfare and 
security at an ever-increasing rate, in many cases much sooner than expected, due to the 
crowdsourcing power of OSCs driving these evolutions. Proactive planning and 
preparation of the battlespace needs to happen now, especially within special mission 
                                                 
88 University of California, Santa Cruz, “Ebola Genome Portal,” UCSC Genome Informatics Group, 
accessed May 6, 2015, https://genome.ucsc.edu/ebolaPortal/; Virus Pathogen Research, “Ebolavirus,” 
accessed May 7, 2015, http://www.viprbrc.org/brc/home.spg?decorator=filo_ebola. 
89 Maxx Chatsko, “5 Crazy Technologies made Possible by 3-D Bioprinting,” Motley Fool, November 
12, 2013, http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/11/12/5-crazy-technologies-made-possible-by-3-d-
bioprint.aspx; Scott Grunewald, “Cambrian Genomics 3D Printing DNA—Sets Its Sights on Space 
Dinosaurs,” 3D Printing Industry, April 10, 2014, http://3dprintingindustry.com/2014/04/10/cambrian-
genomics-3d-printing-dna/. 
90 Bridget Butler Millsaps, “Autodesk Genetic Engineer Is Able to 3D Print Viruses, Soon to Attack 
Cancer Cells,” 3DPrint.com, October 17, 2014, http://3dprint.com/19594/3d-printed-virus-fights-cancer/; 
Pugh, “Vaccines Built on a 3D Printer”; Paul Marks, “3D Printing and Augmented Reality to Help Model 
Drugs,” NewScientist, October 18, 2011, 2, http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2011/10/3d-
printed-viruses-meet-their.html. 
91 Geoffrey Shmigelsky, “Exponential Technology,” Think Exponential, accessed May 6, 2015, 
http://thinkexponential.com/invest/exponential-technology/; Brian Krassenstein, “The Moore’s Law of 3D 
Printing… Yes It Does Exist, and Could Have Staggering Implications,” 3DPrint.com, June 28, 2014, 
http://3dprint.com/7543/3d-printing-moores-law/. 
 41 
units and those units most likely to be tasked with dealing with negative aspects of these 
advancements.92 
H. THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM 
The intent of this chapter was to illustrate the speed, complexity, challenges, and 
gaps in the RLT space. The majority of RLT users seek to make the world a better place, 
which is why understanding technology and regulatory concerns is the first step toward 
finding solid solutions. How the government chooses to interact with OSCs can make the 
difference between sound policy and good intelligence or ineffective policy and getting 
blindsided by an exponential 9/11. The key to next-generation security will be found 
within these groups and their ethical efforts. Trust, transparency, partnerships, and active 
collaboration are all necessary for success. As the following case studies demonstrate, 
there are right ways and wrong ways to approach the online community. Understanding 
the culture, whom to partner with, and how is paramount to international security.93 
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IV. NAVIGATING THE COMPLEX CULTURE DRIVING 
RADICAL LEVELING TECHNOLOGIES 
In the life sciences, researchers and security officials hadn’t much history 
of working together. After 9/11, tensions threatened to grow between 
them. Neither group understood how the other operated and each thought 
the other was basically clueless. 
Gerald Epstein, Director AAAS Center for Science, Technology and 
Security Policy 
In 2012, a company called Defense Distributed became the first producer of a 3D-
printed firearm, called the Liberator. Intended by the group to be a political statement 
concerning the protection of constitutional freedoms online and to send a message to 
global governments about the regulation of digital technologies, the project was quickly 
misinterpreted as a significant threat to security. The State Department officially 
requested that Defense Distributed remove the designs from their website, indicating that 
the files may be subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a policy 
responsible for regulating weapons and certain kinds of technical data. The group 
complied, but not before over a hundred thousand downloads of the design had been 
recorded.94 Today, it is easy to find and download the original files from numerous online 
locations. A second statement by the State Department issued in June 2015 took a 
stronger stance on the issue of 3D gun design, declaring the intent to restrict specific 
types of designs and to require developers to obtain approval before “online publication 
of any technical data that . . . would allow for the creation of weapons . . .”95  
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This is one example of many in which a cultural misunderstanding complicated a 
situation that could have been resolved in a much simpler fashion. Understanding that 
Defense Distributed is an outgrowth of an online cultural group known as the 
cypherpunks, who are dedicated to the protection of individual user rights online, 
especially freedom of speech and expression, may have influenced the State Department 
to take a different approach. The case studies in this chapter will underscore three 
primary themes of attempts to utilize traditional methods of regulation against this 
problem set: 1) a lack of understanding of cultural norms and moral issues will negate 
applied legal measures, 2) a failure to understand and incorporate the cultures of the 
regulatees will lead to failed policy, and 3) the negative effects of applying quick policy 
fixes to RLT and online OSCs can cause nations to be less secure and grant a foothold for 
rogue actors. 
While the State Department’s intentions were to enhance public safety, the effect 
achieved was the opposite. Within days of the June announcement, online groups that had 
been openly discussing 3D printing firearms suddenly instituted private chat rooms, 
deleted comments on how to meet existing gun laws or ways to circumvent the law, and 
began looking to encryption programs or Dark Web servers sponsored by foreign entities 
to escape US jurisdiction. Any visibility that open-source analysts had on this particular 
technological evolution, how quickly the technology was diffusing, and which groups 
might be willing to collaborate with the government to conduct self-policing or threat 
warning disappeared overnight. This phenomenon is not new, yet it continues to pose a 
stumbling block to regulators. As in the battle by MGM to stop illegal music sharing, the 
danger of making a moral issue into a market issue means that legal measures, especially 
measures that are likely to have little to no impact, generally result in anonymizing 
behaviors, high rates of diffusion via digital means, and isolation of user groups, 
restricting participation in constructive, collaborative solution forums. The technology 
evolves in exactly the manner the regulator had hoped to avoid.96 One reporter did a good 
job of summing up the ill-conceived regulation strategy: 
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Even those who do not feel that everyone should have the ability to print 
their own guns have to see the lopsided logic at blocking access to the 3D 
printable gun instructions when directions on how to craft fertilizer bombs 
and make poisons [are] still readily available.97 
Technological change can be daunting. But it is important to recognize when that 
change is occurring and then take the time to formulate an appropriate response. Failure 
to do so can make a simple political statement into a much bigger problem.98 The 
Liberator demonstrates the impact the lack of understanding of the “foreign” culture of 
OSCs and the influence (or lack thereof) that cookie-cutter policies and outdated 
regulations can have. While cultural training is stressed for military and diplomats 
operating in foreign nations, it is seldom discussed in terms of cyber and technology 
policy. This shortsightedness has a cost: alienated and radicalized OSCs, an online 
community that fails to report apparent threats to national security or public safety, stifled 
innovation that damages the US economy and military, and the creation of dangerous 
blind spots that can function as cyber safe havens for nefarious actors. The most 
important factor in the development of policy is understanding the culture and 
environment in which that policy needs to operate. This chapter will be devoted to 
identifying successful and failed attempts to engage with OSCs, to provide an 
understanding of some of the critical nuances explicit to policy and regulation in the 
digital dimension. Without this grounding, RLT policy development will at best have 
limited success or at worst be a total failure that results in enhanced operational security 
for threat actors.99 
This chapter will provide an introduction to the online open-source culture. While 
groups may have their own unique personalities, all online groups embrace a shared 
cyber culture and (with the exception of a radical minority) obey its mandates. The case-
study segment will follow, with five examples of negative interactions between 
government or corporate actors and OSCs (to include individual actors), highlighting 
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what went wrong, why, and the end results (costs) of the interaction. A look at existing 
policy and identified shortfalls using 3D printing as an example will be included. Then, 
five positive case-study interactions will be examined with a focus on why these 
interactions were successful and what government and corporate entities did differently 
to make them a success. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of elements 
that can help to craft smart policy for the digital environment while avoiding known 
pitfalls that can lead to the “compliance without effect” problem experienced by 
policymakers grappling with RLT today.100 
A number of academic and research centers have begun to study cyber culture and 
the culture of online communities in order to understand their norms, values, and beliefs. 
While some groups are very accessible, like the makers, others, like cyber gangs, can be 
more reclusive and harder to study.101 A good starting point for understanding OSCs and 
their culture can be found in the groups that represent them and their concerns in public. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is one of the primary public-action groups within the 
United States representing individuals and groups in the digital world. Their focus on 
“free speech, fair use, supporting innovation, privacy, freedom of expression, and 
transparency” is a good representation of what many online OSCs are about. The 
majority of “netizens” seek to use their actions online and in advancing technology to 
                                                 
100 Bryans, “Unlocked and Loaded.” 
101 Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner, “Internet Subcultures and Oppositional Politics,” Post-
subcultures Reader (2003): 299–314. https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/ 
internetsubculturesoppositionalpolitics.pdf; Donna Gibbs and Kerri-Lee Krause, eds., Cyberlines 2.0: 
Languages and Cultures of the Internet (James Nicholas, 2006); Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner, “New 
Media and Internet Activism: From the ‘Battle of Seattle’ to Blogging,” New Media & Society 6, no. 1 
(February 2004): 87–95, doi: 10.1177/1461444804039908; Alison Powell, “Emerging Issues in Internet 
Regulation: The Unstable Role of WikiLeaks and Cyber-Vigilantism,” in Research Handbook on Internet 
Governance, ed. Ian Brown (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012); Rheingold, Howard. Smart Mobs: 
The Next Social Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2003. 
 47 
improve the world and have chosen to obey the core rules of “netiquette.”102 These rules 
include such items as “remember the human, adhere to the same standards of behavior 
online that you follow in real life, share expert knowledge, respect other people’s privacy, 
and don’t abuse your power.”103 They also identify “cyberspace predators, alternate or 
anonymous persona usage, electronic forgery, chain letters and hoaxes, email harassment, 
worms, viruses, snooping, and mailbombing” as “egregious violations of netiquette.”104 
The culture is one of respectful freedom that values collaborators, open dialogue, and 
passionate discourse on the way the world is and how to improve it. Online reputation is 
everything. This is because the online culture is a gift culture.105 Reputation and 
credibility are the currencies of success. Hacker Eric Raymond highlights why the 
features of the gift culture specific to the online community are so very central: 
There are reasons general to every gift culture why peer repute (prestige) 
is worth playing for: First and most obviously, good reputation among 
one's peers is a primary reward. We're wired to experience it that way for 
evolutionary reasons touched on earlier. . . . Secondly, prestige is a good 
way (and in a pure gift economy, the only way) to attract attention and 
cooperation from others. If one is well known for generosity, intelligence, 
fair dealing, leadership ability, or other good qualities, it becomes much 
easier to persuade other people that they will gain by association with you. 
Thirdly, if your gift economy is in contact with or intertwined with an 
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exchange economy or a command hierarchy, your reputation may spill 
over and earn you higher status there . . .106 
This explains in part why OSCs frequently self-police and when individuals or 
groups are found to be breaking the rules of the online community it is taken seriously. 
Credibility both in cyber and in real life (IRL) matters. This can be seen in hundreds of 
actions taken daily to stop criminal acts, to create and not destroy the Internet, and to 
protect public safety. From the use of social media networks to catch criminals in 
Philadelphia to the actions of hackers to stop an online gang from ruining Christmas for 
Xbox gamers to the work of hacktivist groups like Anonymous to voluntarily combat the 
online hatred of ISIS, the online community is striving to make a positive difference. 
There are hundreds of thousands of cyber citizens who are born collaborators, subject-
matter experts, problem solvers, and cyber-community-watch members creating an 
untapped resource for increasing security capacity at an international level. That is why 
understanding the underlying culture of OSCs, much like understanding the culture of a 
foreign nation, is the first step in addressing the challenges of RLT while still 
guaranteeing innovation and the protection of freedoms.107 
The case studies that follow highlight examples of interactions between 
government officials, corporate officials, and entities involved with new technologies and 
processes within the cyber realm. The goal is not to identify every policy pitfall or policy 
win, but to show a range to establish a baseline for policymakers to work from. RLT are 
and will likely remain inextricably tied to the digital world, so the case studies focus on 
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examples that provide data points necessary for success in policy development for the 
digital environment. The first set of case studies, of adverse interactions, includes MGM 
v. Grokster, Bernstein v. Department of Justice, Junger v. Department of State, 
LightSquared v. GPS, and a dual case examination of Defense Distributed v. Department 
of State and the 3D-printed gun ban implemented by the city of Philadelphia. In the final 
case study, the two examples are intertwined and have several important aspects that 
pertain to regulating today’s digital environment.108 
A. MGM V. GROKSTER: THE PEER-TO-PEER PROBLEM 
In February of 2000, MGM led a joint industry suit against peer-to-peer (P2P) 
music distributors and a group of individual P2P users and developers, claiming that 
these services were leading to a reduction in revenue. The company’s intent was to 
protect intellectual property rights and to deter any future P2P projects from gaining 
traction. To the point, the courts found in favor of MGM. Yet despite the ruling and 
additional prosecutions, instances of P2P use continued to increase. An anthropological 
illustration used by Brafman and Beckstrom paints the picture of what happened next. 
Much like Cortés and the Spanish conquest of the Americas, MGM was successful in its 
efforts to target and force the startup P2P entities to stop. However, that targeting caused 
the OSCs at work to adapt their network structures, becoming like Cortés’s nemesis: the 
Apache tribe. Cortés’s initial success was due to the fact that he was pitted against 
hierarchical networks with well-defined centers of gravity. The Aztecs and Incan cities 
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were easy prey for the Spanish and their conventional tactics, but all that changed with 
the Apache. The Apache were nomads, with no defined leadership structure or key terrain 
that the Spanish could target. Cortés’s strategy started to fall apart, and the Apache 
succeeded in driving him from their lands.109  
Similar to the Apache, the decentralized nature of OSCs created an overmatch to 
the music industry’s strategy. The more the music industry fought against these OSCs, 
the stronger they became. OSCs adopted increasingly decentralized open structures to 
defeat identifying measures that could lead to prosecution. P2P servers moved offshore or 
outside of US jurisdiction and developed serverless software, evolving into Grokster, 
eDonkey, and later eMule, each more impervious to MGM’s attempts at regulation. 
EMule was an especially brilliant bit of innovation. It was the first open-source P2P 
software with no known author, and it functioned autonomously online. It became the 
bulletproof standard for combatting regulation of P2P sharing. Without any targetable 
information, MGM had no way to stop the sharing. EMule continues to function across 
the web today.110  
The actions taken by MGM were meant to make P2P file sharing a highly visible 
crime but instead made the problem of copyright infringement worse. By setting a low 
price (cost of action) on the violation, MGM turned a moral issue, stealing, into a market 
issue, a risk-benefit equation in which the risk continued to decrease while legal costs 
remained the same. This encouraged P2P adoption by a greater segment of the 
population. The other problem confronting MGM was one of bias. Big organizations tend 
to suffer from the belief that 1) the status quo is the best option, 2) change will require a 
departure from the organization’s current capabilities and may be more costly, so 3) the 
organization refuses to abandon them even if they are consistently losing ground to other 
methods. In deterrence theory, the concept of punishment resulting in specific costs 
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should function to limit the unwanted behavior. Yet in cases like MGM v. Grokster, a 
“motivation crowding” effect occurs. This is when individual actions are incentivized 
toward compliance or defiance of a regulation based on external factors such as a fine or 
a bonus. These external factors change the moral principles that have been in play (don’t 
steal because stealing is bad), replacing them with an action based on marketplace 
calculations (I can legally buy this music or I can get it for free online with very little risk 
of getting punished). In the case of P2P file sharing, the effects of MGM’s actions can be 
explained as follows: 
The external monetary motivation of the industry lawsuits crowded out the 
internal incentive to act in an honest way and pay for the content one 
acquires. ‘Civic virtue (a particular manifestation of intrinsic motivation) 
… bolstered if the public laws convey the notion that citizens are to be 
trusted,’ was undermined by the industry’s actions in pursuing lawsuits 
against individuals. Conversely when citizens feel that they are not trusted, 
they react by breaking the law if they expect the cost of doing so to be 
low. In a study, students who already shared files reported that heavy 
sanctions led them to believe their behavior was more ethical than 
moderate sanctions did.111 
MGM and its industry partners spent millions trying to stop P2P technology, and 
in the end their efforts had very little effect. Today, digital music is available from a 
number of online for-pay vendors as well as via P2P sources. Recent studies have even 
found that P2P has been beneficial to big music. Music quality is up, cost is down, a 
much bigger pool of talent is available to recruiters, and revenue has increased thanks to 
new digital music products.112 The very “unpredictability and experimentation” that 
characterizes the digital environment served to expand the digital marketplace for 
music.113 
In the case of MGM, the policy and regulation attempts failed due to bias (status 
quo bias and endowment effect), a misunderstanding of how application of policy via 
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legal means would change the equation from a moral calculation to one of price setting, 
and a lack of clarity about the desired end state. The result was the proliferation of a 
disruptive technology. This interaction resulted in lost time and resources for MGM as 
well as bad relations with the OCSs behind P2P. If MGM had taken the time to research 
this phenomenon first and to reach out to the OSCs involved, it is likely some sort of 
collaborative agreement could have been reached that would have reduced the price of 
music while also ensuring that positive relations were maintained, reinforcing the cultural 
norms (limiting P2P participation because it was viewed as stealing), and reducing the 
potential to create a market effect (public feels justified in pursuing free music sharing 
based on response of authority). Partnering would have resulted in an overall net gain 
instead of lost resources and damaged relations that created an anonymous file-sharing 
server and a great deal of mistrust with the online community.114 
B. THE CYPHER WAR PERIOD: ZIMMERMAN, BERNSTEIN, AND 
JUNGER VS. US POLICY 
The P2P fight was not the first time a corporate or government entity had 
encountered this type of regulatory challenge. History holds several pertinent examples 
that may have seemed like anomalies but actually formed the start of a new historical 
trend and of an important era in OSC history known as the Cypher Wars. During the 
1990s, concerns over export and sharing of cryptographic methods led to failed 
regulation. This would be the start of a trend highlighting the failure of policy to keep 
pace with technological evolution.115 
Government policy aimed to maintain US and UK superiority in the encryption 
field, an area in which these nations had dominated since World War II. Cryptographic 
developments were subject to review by the government under the US Munitions List 
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(USML), with the goal of protecting US communications and also preventing foreign 
nations from gaining advanced encryption capabilities. The regulation of encryption 
posed a significant barrier to those working in the field by limiting the ability to share 
information and techniques and restricting much of the collaborative work that occurs 
globally in cryptography today. These restrictions led to several court cases which 
signaled the start of the OSC move toward greater decentralization, the use of open 
source to gain independence from outdated government policy, and the development of 
innovations leading to the exponential evolutions that challenge traditional regulation 
today.116 
In 1991, Phil Zimmerman, a computer scientist and hacker, developed and 
released an open-source encryption package known as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). The 
program was shared on Internet forums to support peace activists. It quickly spread from 
US users to global activists seeking secure communications tools to protect their 
networks from crackdowns by radical and dictatorial regimes. The USML was the 
primary regulatory vehicle at the time for encryption programs. Encryption software that 
used 40-bit keys or less was not subject to regulation, but a tool like PGP, which used a 
128-bit key, was classified as military-grade encryption and subject to export controls. 
Zimmerman’s good intentions were soon under criminal investigation for export of an 
encryption program without a license. In the first example of “compliance without 
effect,”117 Zimmerman stopped sharing PGP online and replaced it with a published 
book. Anyone could purchase the book, which contained the complete text source code to 
create a copy of PGP. Books, unlike code, were protected by the First Amendment and 
not subject to regulation by the USML. The criminal investigation was eventually 
dropped. To avoid future regulatory issues, specifically patent and export-control trouble, 
Zimmerman upgraded PGP and made the code open source. PGP continued to be 
published in book format until export regulations were finally changed nine years later.118 
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The battle to have code recognized as protected speech under the First 
Amendment continued, this time at the University of California Berkley. Daniel 
Bernstein, a student in the mathematics department, sought to publish an academic paper 
on an encryption algorithm he had developed, dubbed Snuffle. Bernstein wanted to share 
the source code to his algorithm, but like Zimmerman, he was told the code could not be 
shared because it fell under the USML and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 
which was designed to keep defense-related technologies from potential adversaries. 
Since Snuffle was not a government project nor designed or funded for use by the 
government, Bernstein filed a lawsuit against the State Department protesting the 
restriction. The courts eventually found in favor of Bernstein. The final finding 
determined that source code was: 
[F]unctional language [that] deserves free speech protections, that source 
code is protectable speech . . . and that the ITAR licensing system as 
applied to Category XIII(B) [which pertains to cryptography] acts as an 
unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment . . . 
and is unenforceable . . .119 
A third case began in 1996, when Peter Junger, a professor at Case Western 
Reserve University, was restricted to teaching a US-only class on computer law because 
the encryption software he used was export controlled under the USML and ITAR. 
Junger filed a case against the US government, and in 2000, the courts again ruled that 
“source code is indeed a protected, expressive means of speech secured by the First 
Amendment.”120 
In all three above examples, existing regulations (USML and ITAR) were 
unsuccessful in addressing government concerns. Broad application of policy to a 
complex problem set (export control), failure to address a specific security concern (lack 
of targeted policy), poor formulation (policy results in unequal application, leading to 
ineffective regulation and wasted resources), and poor execution (it was nine years before 
policy changed) are systemic issues that will prevent the government from successfully 
addressing linear technological advances, not to mention addressing the exponential 
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challenges presented by RLT. Anonymizing technologies, distrust of the government, and 
proliferation of disruptive technology via digital means were the end result.121 
A more succinct illustration of exactly how traditional regulations and policy 
would fare when pitted against an RLT can be seen in the below table, which emphasizes 
the challenges of applying existing policy and regulation to 3D-printed gun designs.122 
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These same challenges appear when considering the application of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Wassenaar Arrangement, Drug Enforcement Agency’s export 
control 21 CFR Part 1312 (because certain 3D printers can manufacture drugs),123 Export 
Administration Regulations, or the Commerce Control List. While many of the 
regulations have caveats to control and protect information, technology, or certain types 
of data, none of them are enforceable online. More to the point, less than 1% of those 
who perpetrate online crimes (such as identity theft, cyberfraud, or cyberattacks) are 
actually caught and prosecuted. If it is this challenging to enforce existing criminal law in 
cyberspace, how much more challenging will it be to enforce regulations—designed to 
control the physical movement of dangerous items—in a digital environment where 
decentralized P2P software can share encrypted files that are undetectable even when 
displayed in plain sight?124 
C. POLICY PITFALLS: PHILADELPHIA’S 3D GUN BAN 
The Liberator example shows just how complex the cyber/technology regulatory 
environment and how swift an online community response can be, especially when the 
state choses to take a “hard policing” approach. Even though Defense Distributed 
voluntarily obeyed the State Department’s request, the Liberator files are still on the web, 
and they continue to proliferate and evolve. Attorney Danton Bryans discusses the 
developing culture of “compliance without effect,” noting that although online and 
technology actors may comply with regulation requests, the digital environment and its 
accompanied technologies negate these actions. This is a definite challenge to traditional 
policy meant to address the problems of a linear, physical world. A second aspect, the 
“Streisand effect,” further complicates the task of designing and implementing effective 
policy. The Streisand effect, named after Barbra Streisand’s efforts to remove photos of 
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her private beach home from the web, occurs when policy dictates that information be 
removed from the digital environment or tries to restrict access. When this happens, 
actions taken have the opposite effect and result in widespread proliferation. In the case 
of Defense Distributed, the State Department’s intent was to limit access to the files and 
prevent proliferation. Today, the Liberator has been joined by an increasingly diverse 
array of 3D weapon designs, the exact opposite of the desired end state.125 
Reactive policy is another serious pitfall. In 2013, the City of Philadelphia 
announced a pre-emptive policy outlawing all 3D-printed guns. Citizens were notified 
that they were not allowed to 3D print any gun in whole or in part. With this policy, 
Philadelphia opened itself to a resource intensive, unenforceable legal quagmire. How 
will the city know if a citizen has a 3D printer? How will it know if the citizen has 
downloaded a 3D weapon file for a printer or actually printed a gun or gun parts? Bill no. 
130584 offers no details on how this ordinance will be enforced. What will the 
punishment be? Will it be different for juveniles than for adults? What about 3D-printed 
guns used in jewelry, in artwork, or as a political statement? Will this broad policy open 
the city up to a barrage of lawsuits?126 The policy failed as soon as it was announced. It 
was reactive and developed in response to a perceived threat, one that may not have even 
existed within the city. The application of broad policy vice a targeted policy shows a 
lack of understanding, making it ineffective and unenforceable, with the potential to 
generate a number of legal battles. A third failure point is that no one with subject-matter 
expertise was involved in crafting this policy. A lack of understanding of an RLT when 
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developing policy means that the OSCs involved are more likely to reject that policy, to 
anonymize, and to work successfully against any enforcement attempts.127  
A much more effective approach would have been to work with local OSC 
members to craft a smart policy that considered the technology and focused on those 
specific areas of concern to public safety. Partnering with public and private subject-
matter experts does several things: it creates open communications channels, builds trust, 
gets buy-in, and results in policy that will actually work, because the people who are 
regulated by it helped to create it. Partnering also prevents conflict between government 
and technology drivers and users, another challenge that is becoming more common in 
the policy arena.128 
D. LIGHTSQUARED: TECHNOLOGY VS. THE GOVERNMENT 
In 2004, mobile communications venture company LightSquared developed, 
applied for, and was approved to operate a 4G LTE network within the US. The company 
decided to modify the network setup to include a series of ground stations. The problem 
with the new setup came when LightSquared ground stations began to interfere with 
federal government Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, most significantly those 
owned by the military under Air Force Space Command. The company had been told that 
they must resolve any interference issues, but LightSquared pushed ahead without a 
mitigation plan. The issue was brought before Congress. Air Force General William L. 
Shelton testified that after extensive research, no mitigation options had been found that 
would allow the military GPS receivers and the LightSquared network to effectively 
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coexist. LightSquared went bankrupt, and the Air Force GPS receivers went back to 
work.129 
While the problem was solved, the resolution was far from satisfactory to all 
parties. Conflicts that result in failed enterprises like LightSquared mean that future 
private technological endeavors may be built explicitly to avoid interaction with the 
government. This will not be the last battle to occur between government and technology, 
and as noted in a recent Air Force Magazine article, “it was unsettling to see a business 
plan boldly pitted against national security requirements and a fight driven by investor 
interests.”130 
As demonstrated by these first case studies, there is much work to be done. The 
US appears poorly organized to deal with regulation in an exponential environment. 
Policy itself is one part of the solution, but the government also needs to be able to 
effectively partner with highly dynamic innovative organizations, a difficult task for a 
hierarchical, linear structure.131 Conflict will continue between government and 
innovators as long as the two remain separated by processes, cultural differences, 
language, and a lack of effective partnerships.132 Indifference, lack of incentive to work 
with government entities, and the ability and resources to move ahead without a 
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government partner provide innovators a great deal of leverage. It is doubtful that once 
such an evolution takes place the government will be able to catch up via existing 
bureaucratic processes. It would be like a motorhome trying to catch a Tesla, and likely 
as successful.133 
These five case studies illustrate some of the challenges for regulators working 
within the RLT space. None of this is life threatening at this time; that may not be the 
case three years from now. Exponential advancements are making RLT more accessible, 
and the number of dangerous incidents reported is also exponentially increasing: effective 
drone employment by non-state actors against nation-states; computer hacks that control 
boats, trains, and planes; 3D-printed illicit drug sales; synthetic biological organisms; and 
battlefield robot snipers all seem like plotlines for some wild science fiction story, but all 
of these events have already occurred.134 
In the next section, five case studies showing progress in the area of RLT and 
OSC collaboration will be examined. In each case, specific actors came together with 
government or corporate agencies to make a positive difference. These cases demonstrate 
the power such partnerships can have when facing exponential challenges. The case 
studies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DIY biohackers 
partnership, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Industrial Control Systems 
Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), Finest Squad vs. Lizard Squad as an 
example of cyber self-policing, hacktivist group Anonymous’s voluntary support to 
counterterrorism efforts against ISIS, and the DHS San Diego Law Enforcement 
Coordination Center (SD-LECC) fusion center agreement with the San Diego InfraGard 
Members Alliance (IMA) as a successful example of a formalized partnership with 
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public- and private-sector actors to meet homeland-security and disaster-preparedness 
requirements.135 
E. THE FBI AND BIOHACKING: BUILDING A CULTURE OF SHARED 
SECURITY VALUES 
Partnering with actors at the leading edge of RLT development and employment 
is one way to keep pace with developments in this area, and it has paid tremendous 
dividends in the growing field of biohacking and synthetic biology. As the movement 
became more popular, concern over the lack of standardized safety protocols and 
regulation led security experts to advocate for a new strategy to limit potential risks. The 
FBI decided to start an outreach program to biohacking groups to discuss security 
concerns and advocate for ethical and responsible biology standards. Special Agent You, 
lead for the outreach effort, used his prior experience as a gene therapist to set up a series 
of biosecurity conferences and informal meetings across the nation to introduce the FBI, 
US Department of Health and Human Services, and State Department to this OSC. At 
first the groups were hesitant about the government’s involvement, but fears quickly 
dissipated when government representatives voiced their goal: “to build common cause 
on efforts to support research while raising awareness of security issues.”136 Researchers, 
hobbyists, biotech firms, and government policymakers began to work together to 
balance the potential risks and benefits of these cutting-edge developments, guaranteeing 
                                                 
135 Lempinen, “FBI, AAAS Collaborate”; Kenrick Vezina, “Culture Wars Threaten Synthetic 
Biology’s Future: Debate on Open Source Versus Closed Door,” Genetic Literacy Project, May 9, 2014, 
http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/05/09/culture-wars-threaten-synthetic-biologys-future-debate-
on-open-source-versus-closed-door/; Anthony Cuthbertson, “Anonymous Affiliate GhostSec Thwarts ISIS 
Terror Plots in New York and Tunisia,” International Business Times, July 22, 2015, 1–3, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-affiliate-ghostsec-thwarts-isis-terror-plots-new-york-tunisia-
1512031; Parker Scott, “The FBI’s InfraGard Program,” presentation, InfraGard San Diego Members 
Alliance, July 20, 2012, http://www.infragardsd.org/docs/isd-ppt.pdf; Adam Stone, “National Fusion 
Center Model Is Emerging,” Emergency Management, January 23, 2015, 1–3; Matthew Miller, 
“Formalizing Fusion Center Public and Private Sector Partnerships, A Practical Model,” San Diego Law 
Enforcement Coordination Center & San Diego InfraGard Member Alliance White Paper, March 2015. 
136 Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman, and Steven Kotler, “Hacking the President’s DNA,” Atlantic, 
November 2012, 1–29; Scott Leibrand, “How and Why We Are Working with the FDA: Background and a 
Brief Summary of the Recent Meeting with the FDA about the Nightscout Project,” DIYPS.org, October 
12, 2014, http://diyps.org/2014/10/12/how-and-why-we-are-working-with-the-fda-background-and-a-brief-
summary-of-the-recent-meeting-with-the-fda-about-the-nightscout-project/; Lempinen, “FBI, AAAS 
Collaborate”; You, Edward H. “FBI Perspective: Addressing Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity.” 
Presentation. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2010. 
 63 
innovation while protecting public safety by setting effective standards to prevent 
ignorant or illicit use of these technologies.137 
Government officials had reason to be concerned. The 2001 anthrax attacks and 
the successful mail-order purchase of smallpox by the Guardian meant existing 
biotechnology regulations were falling short. In an effort to close the gaps, federal agents 
aggressively interviewed academics, researchers, and biotech firms to find a viable 
solution. But this approach caused the biotech community, including analysts working for 
the FBI, to feel mistrusted, ostracized, and isolated. Kavita Berger, associate program 
director for the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy, conducted a poll of 
researchers following the government interviews. The results, as far as promoting a 
cooperative, collaborative information-sharing environment, were abysmal. The federal 
approach had created a more closed, suspicious, fearful group of individuals who were 
now less likely to reach out to law enforcement. The lack of an open, transparent 
relationship meant that efforts to improve security would be limited at best. Policy 
implemented from these efforts would likely fail or make the situation worse by imposing 
regulations that hindered legitimate science but had little impact on improving security.138 
Berger noted, “[Collaboration is] ultimately going to be a lot more productive and a lot 
more useful in reaching the end goals of security and science.”139 
In large part, the FBI outreach initiative is responsible for turning this situation 
around. The end result is a series of collaborative partnerships that has led to substantial 
improvements in biosecurity by identifying gaps and potential threats. The initiative is a 
solution incubator, providing policymakers with the subject-matter expertise critical to 
improving security. Policymakers gain a true understanding of technological capabilities 
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and how to best address challenges. A secondary benefit has been the development of 
mutual respect and a culture of shared values between the federal government and the 
biohacking OSCs.140 Ellen Jorgensen, president of Genspace, a community lab in New 
York City, highlighted the benefit of partnering as seen from the OSC side. 
I think that the meetings we have had were very useful in terms of 
fostering some trust between the FBI and the DIYBio community. . . . We 
are all arriving at the same place, it seems, dragged kicking and screaming 
into more organization than we thought we’d be comfortable with in the 
beginning. But if a system of safety standards, operating procedures, 
advisory committees, and training records for lab members will allow us 
to get on to the good stuff and do science instead of just talking about it, 
it’s a small price to pay.141 
The FBI’s outreach is one example of an effective approach to threat mitigation. 
When asked his thoughts on the outreach program, Special Agent You acknowledged the 
benefits to both DIYBio and the FBI: 
We’ve started building these bridges and we have a real commitment to 
understanding this community and a real appreciation . . . the reason the 
FBI is reaching out to DIY biology groups is not because there’s a threat . 
. . but because we want to make sure it’s done safely and securely.142 
The FBI–DIYBio collaboration provides some important takeaways for 
government members involved with RLT. Partnering with an OSC grants policymakers 
and regulators access to valuable insights and subject-matter expertise necessary to create 
effective policy. DIYBio, as an informed partner, also benefits by understanding the 
government’s safety and security concerns and works internally to mitigate those 
concerns. The OSC can conduct activities openly, with no need for anonymizing 
technology, which in turn aids preventing threat-actor exploitation. Since the 
development of this partnership, DIYBio has stepped up efforts to emphasize a culture of 
ethical, responsible science embedded in the group’s cultural norms. This is a powerful 
tool in protecting against abuse. For these groups, science is everything. It is a chance to 
make the world a better place. DIYBio will not jeopardize that by willfully performing 
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science that threatens public safety and security. Finally, a network of self-policing 
groups now exists with the expertise to detect and identify illicit, dangerous actions or 
limit the access of potential nefarious actors to the free expertise offered by these OSCs. 
The cost of the outreach program is low. Fewer than a hundred FBI agents actively 
engage with the DIYBio community to promote continued information sharing and open 
discussion. Developing a parallel network with the access and expertise required to 
monitor and regulate a global OSC would cost millions of dollars, while the impact of 
such an endeavor would be minimal. The end result would be ineffective policy and 
reactive threat response instead of the proactive, innovative, cost-effective approach that 
exists today.143 
F. THE BATTLE FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: DHS 
AND ICS-CERT 
The Internet is one of the most powerful Radical Leveling Technologies in 
existence. A tremendous source for innovation, the Internet is also a vehicle for 
disruption and destruction. One area of concern is targeted attacks against critical 
infrastructure. To find agile solutions that can match the decentralized, hybrid efforts of 
cyberattackers against infrastructure targets, the Department of Homeland Security built a 
collaborative partnership with various OSCs to enhance its capabilities in this area. The 
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team was created for just this 
purpose. The mission of ICS-CERT is “to reduce risks within and across all critical 
infrastructure by forming a partnership with law enforcement agencies and the 
intelligence community and coordinating efforts among federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments and control system owners, operators, and vendors.”144 ICS-CERT is a 24/7 
reach-back and emergency-response capability that relies on OSCs to provide cyber-
situational awareness and immediate onsite incident response around the globe. ICS-
CERT also provides free training, diagnostics software, malware intelligence, threat 
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briefings, and vulnerability assessments to critical infrastructure owners and operators, 
allowing a proactive approach to threat management. Via alerts and advisories, ICS-
CERT provides valuable, timely information on the digital environment.145 Frank Mong, 
vice president and general manager of solutions for Hewlett-Packard and ICS-CERT 
collaborator, highlighted why a networked structure like ICS-CERT is so important to 
critical infrastructure community members: 
The adversary is an ecosystem. . . . It’s very hard for us to pinpoint a 
specific actor, and what we find is that the threat actors have organized, 
and they’re working together. So whether they’re cyber-criminal gangs to 
nation-states or hacktivists, they’re all collaborating and are very 
specialized. Some are very good at doing certain things and they can sell 
that specialization to somebody else with a particular intent or a particular 
project or plan. We’re talking an entire marketplace, an entire ecosystem 
of highly specialized, highly talented people who have the ability to do a 
lot of different things.146 
Examples like ICS-CERT demonstrate how a hybrid approach to security can 
conserve resources, streamline processes, and produce successful policy solutions. In this 
case, ICS-CERT is the government’s initial attempt to employ a decentralized OSC 
network of expertise and capabilities to address the exponential effects of the cyber 
realm. By building a network to beat a network, ICS-CERT is able to proactively 
confront threats and surge support to sites that need it most. DHS efforts to boost early 
warning by teaming with OSCs and private industry is a study in how to crowdsource 
intelligence. Along with increased agility, the organization relies on a small footprint; in 
2015, it operated on a budget of $8.5 million while supporting 1,600 customers.147 This 
includes classified outreach conducted at the Secret level to share actionable information 
with community members nationwide.148 
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ICS-CERT is a solid initial concept, but there is still work to be done. Intelligence 
shortfalls and coordination issues persist due to bureaucratic stovepipes that hamper 
interagency sharing.149 Fusion centers will need to move away from linear processes and 
structure and embrace the fluid, dynamic nature of OSC culture in order to keep pace 
with exponential evolution.150 ICS-CERT partnership with online community members 
will improve the initial capacity and expertise at little to no cost. This will also provide 
the capabilities necessary to revise existing policy or craft new policy, allowing the 
organization to stay at the leading edge when addressing infrastructure threats. Another 
option is the creation of a cyber-bounty program, which would increase proactive efforts 
to identify security breaches. This should be the focus of the next ICS-CERT outreach to 
OSCs, in order to garner the support of hackers who understand and are willing to 
collaborate on infrastructure security issues.151 
Organizations like ICS-CERT are helpful as an intermediate bridge between 
formal government processes and functioning successfully in a faster technological 
environment. However, in certain cases, a much more decentralized approach is required 
and may in fact be the only viable solution. Corporate tech giants Sony and Microsoft are 
multibillion-dollar enterprises who fight and lose regularly to malicious actors targeting 
the computer and gaming industries. As we have seen, conventional cybercrime units 
cannot keep pace with digital natives. Malicious actors on the net are a minority, but they 
perpetrate a large number of crimes and are difficult to stop. Yet there have been a 
number of instances in which hackers have conducted self-policing efforts to stop those 
who defy online norms for nefarious purposes. One of the harshest reactions to a 
violation of netiquette is doxing (publically posting personal information identifying an 
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individual online), which typically results in severe harassment from members of the 
online community and a visit from police or federal authorities, depending on the nature 
of the violations. These actions maintain balance and prevent nefarious actors from 
wreaking havoc online. 
G. FINEST SQUAD: HACKERS DEFEATING BOT-THUGS WITH CYBER 
SELF-POLICING 
In 2014, a hacker gang called Lizard Squad was in the news following attacks on 
Sony’s PlayStation gaming network and Blizzard’s popular World of Warcraft servers 
and for posting a bomb threat online targeting Sony executive John Smedley. While 
hacking game servers and disrupting service is sometimes acceptable if meant as a brief 
prank or to highlight vulnerabilities, Lizard Squad made their new mission the takedown 
of the Sony PlayStation network and Microsoft’s Xbox network for the entire month of 
December. Lizard Squad even announced their plans online and notified Sony and 
Microsoft of their intent. Despite the advance warning, neither corporation was able to 
stop the attack.152 
In response to public outcry over the holiday attacks, a hacker group called Finest 
Squad decided enough was enough. Working online, the group discovered and revealed 
Lizard Squad’s members through various social media accounts, releasing their home 
addresses, photos, and information to the public and the police. Finest Squad also 
highlighted Lizard Squad’s tactics, a set of hacking tools costing less than $300 that 
targeted specific security flaws in both corporations’ networks and could take out the 
servers using a massive denial of service (DDos) attack. This information was shared 
with both Sony and Microsoft so that fixes could be made. Following the arrests of the 
Lizard Squad, additional information revealed the attacks were conducted to advertise the 
group’s new DDos tool, Lizard Stressor, which the group had been selling online. 
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Though Finest Squad may have prevented future attacks against PS4 and Xbox, it is 
likely that Lizard Stressor may appear again, used by other groups against new targets.153 
This is one example of many in which groups or individuals have self-policed or 
provided aid to law enforcement in order to stop online crimes. These are important 
aspects of the online culture that policymakers need to consider. Incorporating OSCs into 
the policy-development process and inviting them to partner (formally or informally) 
with law enforcement and intelligence will ensure the Internet is kept open, safe, and 
secure while also building capacity, access, and expertise to identify and stop potential 
future threats.154 
H. HACKTIVISM: HOW GROUPS LIKE ANONYMOUS ARE HELPING TO 
IMPROVE SECURITY 
Many find it surprising that Microsoft, a major cybersecurity software provider, 
was defeated by a small group of bad actors using tools that cost less than $500. But this 
is the impact of RLT: the ability to create leverage and change the balance of power in 
unanticipated ways. Malicious actors understand that digital networks grant them an edge 
against the government. The lack of a credible threat to these actors is the reason for the 
continued increase in cybercrime. Though the government is aware of the issues, several 
hacktivist groups have determined the government is ineffective or, due to restrictive 
rules and hierarchical bureaucratic structures, insufficiently agile to address many 
developing technological threats. The hacktivist group Anonymous is one example. 
Anonymous is often confusing to those attempting to understand it and its intentions. The 
challenge comes from the perception that this is a longstanding cohesive group, when in 
fact Anonymous is a collective, an assembly of individuals that form temporarily to 
accomplish shared goals, then splinter and move on to other projects. Members are 
diverse in their beliefs, backgrounds, and reasons for participation. Some choose to the 
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hack the government, while others work alongside. In many cases, government hacks 
come with a message highlighting security shortfalls or proclaiming a political position, 
or sometimes they are simply pranks. Considering these types of actors, there is no doubt 
that John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s prescient thoughts on networks and netwar are in 
play today.155 
Terrorism, including online aspects of terror networks, continues to be a challenge 
globally. Neither law enforcement nor the military is agile enough or has the internal 
expertise to effectively compete with the multitude of hackers and online affiliates 
providing support to groups like Islamic State (IS). In fact, IS was clearly dominating the 
net while national efforts made little permanent progress. In March 2015, that began to 
change as IS was confronted not by a state actor but by a unified front of hacktivists. 
Anonymous, GhostSec, and CtrlSec began collaborating to identify and track members of 
IS online. It is unheard of for these three groups to collaborate on such a large scale, but 
all three are agreed that this effort will protect the public and help defeat a dangerous 
radical element. To date, Anonymous has disrupted over a thousand IS emails, websites, 
and virtual private network (VPN) connections, while GhostSec has reported deletion of 
57,000 IS-related accounts. Anonymous also called on the public for support. The 
hacktivists identified Twitter as central to the IS cyber effort and described how the IS 
system could be dismantled by removing this node. Anonymous solicited the public to 
convince Twitter to shut down the IS accounts. GhostSec also provided critical 
intelligence to authorities concerning a potential IS threat. Those authorities used the 
information to disrupt planned attacks in Tunisia and New York City.156 
Employing digital natives in the fight against malicious actors who pose a clear 
and present threat to the public is a smart next step in addressing the limitations of current 
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regulations and established structures. Anonymous affiliates have provided valuable 
assistance to the FBI and other organizations like US Central Command. While these 
groups certainly have individual agendas, there are also shared agendas that can result in 
a collaborative partnership on specific or limited goals. A group like GhostSec, with a 
stated mission “to eliminate the online presence of Islamic extremist groups such as 
Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab in an effort to stymie 
their recruitment and limit their ability to organize international terrorist efforts,” presents 
a unique opportunity to partner with a group structured to succeed against terror online. 
Cyber bounties could be used to garner additional support from such groups and to focus 
capacity toward a specific problem set, a way to build an OSC-based netwar capability to 
improve public safety and security. This would be similar to the recruitment of groups 
like the Northern Alliance for support against the Taliban, except with one major 
difference: the Northern Alliance held expertise and authority only for Afghanistan. 
Groups like GhostSec operate as part of a transnational, decentralized network, meaning 
they have access to the digital environment around the globe and can conduct operations 
worldwide, keeping the nation ahead of the threat.157 
I. EXPONENTIAL EFFECTS OF DIGITAL PARTNERS: DHS AND THE 
SD-LECC MODEL 
The only way to prepare for exponential threat vectors produced by RLT is to link 
into the web as well. Partnering with digital natives is of proven value. However, it is still 
important to have intermediary structures that can liaise with both big government and 
the decentralized actors online. The DHS San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination 
Center fusion center is just such a structure. SD-LECC is an effective and functional 
solution for the city’s law enforcement needs. The memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with the San Diego InfraGard Members Alliance (IMA) is a good template for 
creating a formalized partnership with OSC and private-sector actors to meet homeland-
security and disaster-preparedness requirements. Similar to the ICS-CERT model, San 
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Diego’s fusion center began as a means to protect critical infrastructure, but as the 
regional IMA groups began to grow, an InfraGard National Members Alliance (INMA) 
was established with 40,000 members, each belonging to a nonprofit organization 
affiliated with the FBI. This collaboration has evolved the IMA mission to include cyber, 
criminal, terror, and national security threats. Recent successes by the San Diego IMA 
highlight just how effective this organization is. Tips on terror activity, major crimes, and 
cyber threats are received regularly. The subject-matter expertise brought to bear by these 
groups is a powerful tool in countering exponential effects and keeping pace with 
cybercrime. The IMA groups participate in homeland-security exercises and provide 
insight into how attacks may be conducted, methods to detect and prevent such attacks, 
and how to improve system resiliency and attribution methods.158 
In 2012, Dr. Gary Warner, a professor at the University of Alabama and 
InfraGard member, used data-mining tools to uncover a money-mule scheme by hackers 
in Eastern Europe. In one of the largest cybercrime cases to date, Warner helped FBI 
agents track and identify hackers and their money mules across the US by identifying the 
spread of the key logger the hackers were using and tracking it back to its source. 
Warner’s students used the tools from their class to identify the remaining mules within 
the US, resulting in the arrest of all but one individual. Operation Trident Beach stopped 
hackers from getting away with almost $70 million they had stolen online. The ability of 
Dr. Warner and his students to operate autonomously and use open-source tools, 
unlimited by government requirements affecting law enforcement and military operators 
acting in a public space, demonstrates the power that leveraging OSC actors can have to 
enforce existing laws online.159 
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The above case studies highlight some important features of the digital landscape 
that can assist in developing strong policy, improving enforcement, and enhancing 
national security and public safety. The government can stay at the leading edge of RLT 
by crafting strategy grounded in the digital environment which grants it the ability to 
evolve as technology evolves. Such a move requires adopting a network perspective that 
can take advantage of the same strengths that transnational illicit networks use to defeat 
physical, legal, and geographic boundaries. It will require new structures to match 
developing decentralized networks and organizations that are equipped to compete in a 
networked world. Policy and law enforcement must evolve to become borderless as well. 
This will reduce regulatory complexity while allowing joint international efforts to 
leverage laws that are not limited by jurisdictional differences. And OSCs must be a 
cornerstone to all of these efforts in order to ensure success.160 
These basic steps are the foundation necessary for constructing a successful 
strategy to deal with RLT. Developing organizational capabilities, understanding specific 
technologies and the implications each brings, and adopting new tactics, techniques, and 
procedures will enable the government to function competitively in an exponential 
environment where networks hold sufficient power to challenge nations.161 
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V. A FLEXIBLE SPECTRUM FOR END-GAME SUCCESS 
The Air Force’s ability to continue to adapt and respond faster than our 
potential adversaries is the greatest challenge we face over the next thirty 
years. 
General Mark A. Welsh, USAF chief of staff, America’s Air Force: A Call 
to the Future, 2014 
In the increasingly intertwined environment of cyber and the physical world, 
creating policy for emerging disruptive technologies that are evolving at an exponential 
rate will now be a common challenge. Radical Leveling Technologies will materialize 
suddenly, producing generational leaps with transnational impacts. The ability of these 
technologies to move from obscure, nascent concepts into mature drivers of disruption 
demands that policymakers approach these challenges with finesse and a solid 
understanding of the risks and benefits each will pose.162 
So far, this thesis has provided insight into the revolutionary technology changes 
occurring today, the open-source cultures intertwined with their evolution, and some of 
the key challenges facing policymakers and regulators. The goal of this final chapter is to 
provide a potential spectrum of solutions that can form the basis of a new approach to 
improving international security while still encouraging innovation. A discussion of the 
four primary policy pitfalls will be followed with a brief exploration into potential 
deterrence options, at which point the paper will transition into a presentation of a 
foundational model (fairly basic in nature, to ensure potential for agility and flexibility) 
with the final goal of providing a framework that can evolve with the RLT class of 
technologies. The focus of this model is to prevent ignorant or malignant employment of 
any RLT. Thus, the final piece will provide policymakers, military, and law enforcement 
entities with initial recommendations on proactive defensive, offensive, and crises-
response options. 
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A. POLICY PITFALLS AND FAILED DETERRENCE 
As demonstrated in the case-study section, much of the failure of current policy 
and regulatory efforts in the digital and technological realm is due to three primary 
factors. The first is that both national and international policy are still grounded in a 
Westphalian concept of law, designed for a nation-state system, not a system in which 
nation-states would be faced with borderless groups wielding new forms of power that 
enable them to compete at the state or regional level. The second factor is that the 
deterrent effect of these policies and laws is mitigated by the digital environment. 
Criminals and rogue actors make rational choices to commit illegal acts because they 
understand that these laws are ill suited to mete out punishment. This calculus has 
empowered individuals and non-state actors to push forward in areas where a nation-state 
may hesitate for fear of repercussions. But in the age of RLT, it is difficult if not 
impossible to punish an actor three time zones away for a digital or technological action 
that impacts an individual within US jurisdiction. Even basic counterproliferation efforts 
require months of paperwork and collaboration before they can move forward 
internationally.163 How much more complex, then, will it be to coordinate effective 
deterrence in this new era of nonattribution and anonymizing tech? The third and final 
factor is that the current legal and regulatory framework from which most of the world 
operates lacks the flexibility to address the complexity of RLT coupled with human 
ingenuity. This system fails to incorporate how existing social orders react to the 
imposition of a legal system that may contradict the norms and rules they have 
established for themselves. Using existing law to cover new challenges instead of 
devising new laws that actually address the problem leads to failed, ineffective policy. 
Decentralization, anonymization, compliance without effect, the Streisand effect, and 
motivation crowding are all the end results of policy that fails to consider the nonlegal 
norms that already exist as part of the online and technological cultures. 
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Dr. Colin Scott, a professor at the University College of Dublin School of Law, 
presents an alternative to this path. Instead of attempting to regulate at a distance, 
governments should seek first to understand the existing organization and social 
structures within the policy problem, because regardless of the implemented policy or the 
establishment of a new regulatory regime, these features will remain.164 
A more fruitful approach would be to seek to understand where the 
capacities lie within the existing regimes, and perhaps to strengthen those 
which appear to pull in the right direction and seek to inhibit those that 
pull the wrong way. In this way, the regulatory reform agenda has the 
potential to address issues of regulatory fragmentation in a manner that 
recognizes both the limits of government capacity and the potential of 
reconceptualizing regulation in other ways, for example that invoke non-
state actors and alternative mechanisms to hierarchy.165 
This approach encourages smart policy that incorporates existing cultural norms 
and mechanisms to ensure success, acceptance, and adherence. Truly knowing the 
perspectives of those who are to be regulated can help avoid conflict between rival 
normative orders that results in failure. This is not easy, and it requires time to identify 
and understand these mechanisms and how to utilize them to good effect. Policymakers 
and regulators will need to have patience, skill, and finesse to operate in the RLT 
environment, as well as a good deal of creativity and imagination.166 
Deterrence is a continual challenge for both the world of technology and the 
digital environment. Until penalties can be effected in a timely manner, maintaining law 
and regulating actors will be problematic. Here the problem is certainly capacity. Nation-
states simply don’t have the ability to enact specific deterrence within these spaces using 
existing laws to good effect. A better option might be to seek opportunities for general 
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deterrence, targeting potential crimes before they are committed by incorporating online 
norms that reinforce the desired end state. Other options, such as technology 
management, prevent the actors from making a negative choice; the technology or 
programming won’t allow for it. But this too could be problematic, as sometimes radical 
actions are required to trigger much-needed change or to solve a new problem. This also 
brings up the question of personal freedoms versus the need for security. Technology 
management has the added danger of allowing those who control the technology to 
control the user. If these entities act in a self-interested way, much damage could be done. 
Figuring out how and where to draw the limits of regulation and even more importantly 
finding commonality between regulation and those being regulated will be critical to 
success. If regulation fails to understand the norms already in play, any instituted legal 
norms will be limited in effect and will serve to increase the complexity and danger of the 
problem set.167 
B. MOVING FORWARD TO THE FUTURE: A SPECTRUM OF 
SOLUTIONS 
In research this topic, it became clear very quickly that this was an important area 
in which not much work was being done. The reasons for this are as complex as the 
problem set itself, but the primary causes are that 1) nation-states have not recognized the 
level to which the world is changing around them or that power is being translated in new 
ways and 2) the speed of RLT development and the technical aspects make it difficult for 
those not in tune with these spaces to understand how radically and how fast this change 
is coming.168 
The good news is that there is time to develop a viable response to deal with the 
challenges posed by RLT and to do so in a way that allows for innovation yet still 
protects state and international security. The following model is intended to be an initial 
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framework from which to build in this area. It is not all encompassing, and while it 
provides ample options for response, it is certainly not a final resolution. In fact, if this 
type of strategizing and response is done correctly, it should evolve with technology. 
The model (shown below) denotes four portions of a spectrum, each of which 
contains specific action options. From top to bottom, the options move from benign 
proactive solutions to active or reactive offensive options during a crisis event. The intent 
is that by pursuing the options at the top, nation-states will avoid having to invoke the 
options at the bottom. The four areas on the spectrum are Collaborative Effects, 
Regulatory Effects, Active Effects (interdiction/preemption), and Offensive Effects 
(crisis/event response). Each of these areas is intertwined with the next, as they are all 
interdependent and necessary for an effective response. 
Figure 3.  Spectrum of Solutions 
 
C. COLLABORATIVE EFFECTS 
This entire process must start with education. Policymakers must understand the 
subtle nuances of specific technology and the underlying culture they are trying to 
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regulate. The first step in becoming well informed is to partner with those OSCs, both 
individuals and groups, at the leading edge of the RLT that exist today, as well as any 
that may arise in the future. These subject-matter experts can provide an accurate 
understanding of the risks and benefits and offer valuable insight into the types of policy 
and regulation that will or won’t work. This must be a two-way collaborative process in 
which both parties become stakeholders and information sharing is open and transparent. 
Other collaborative options include encouraging ethical technological design which 
informs users on acceptable use and safety and encourages features within the existing 
cultures that promote similar values. Only in extreme cases should technological 
management efforts be pursued, as this will change the ability of an RLT to progress in 
specific ways and may result in unforeseen negative consequences that can increase 
problem-set complexity. Additional outreach is necessary to improve and repair 
relationships with isolated OSCs, such as DIY neurotechnology. It is critical that outreach 
to isolated groups send the right message, focusing on safety and security first while still 
guaranteeing the ability to innovate.169 
Outreach to OSCs and the public should be done both in person and through 
appropriate digital means. Recent efforts by the FBI, US Department of Health, and US 
Department of State to collaborate with the DIY biohackers and amateur biotechnology 
communities have improved information sharing and created a culture of shared values. 
Development of a shared culture, especially where values, norms, and ethics are in sync, 
is critical to successful policymaking. OSCs not only provide the expertise and 
understanding policymakers need but they also function as ambassadors and liaisons to 
their communities. When government teams with OSC members, this also impacts their 
reputation and credibility with the community. Positive interactions mean the community 
will be more open to discussions and collaboration on smart policy that focuses on 
specific problem areas. This in turn limits the adoption of anonymizing behaviors, as the 
communities feel comfortable operating in the open; both parties have a shared trust and 
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set of expectations that work to prevent threat actors from exploiting expertise or group 
resources.170 
Safety and standardization of RLT has already begun in several areas. 
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) is working on safety protocols for the 3D-printing industry 
to include specifics on operations and materials. DIYBio and its associates are also 
crafting a standardized set of safety and operating protocols that will be required for all 
individuals seeking to participate in this field. Efforts such as these should be encouraged 
and coupled with complimentary policy that builds on the strengths of existing self-
regulation.171 
D. REGULATORY EFFECTS 
It is also necessary to revisit national and international counterproliferation, cyber, 
and technology policy. As highlighted earlier, much of existing policy falls short in these 
areas and in some cases results in more harm than good. The establishment of 
transnational policy to reduce jurisdictional conflict will also help close existing gaps that 
threat actors have been exploiting. With focused policy development that targets these 
gaps and also incorporates the expertise of subject-matter experts from the field, nations 
can begin to impact illicit actors in these spaces. But policy must also be accompanied by 
the tools and resources necessary to provide credible deterrence and consequences. 
This is a preeminent feature of the developing challenges within existing 
counterproliferation models. RLT capabilities have demonstrated that disruption will 
become more difficult, especially as proliferators shift to the digital environment. While 
there are pathways to defeat proliferators and rogue actors, interdiction of materials and 
physical technology will only accomplish so much. Attempts to control technology and 
code, create back doors to defeat encryption, or restrict digital design should be avoided. 
Previous efforts using these methods have resulted in damaged relationships with OSCs, 
security issues that threat actors have successfully exploited, and increased anonymizing 
                                                 
170 Charisius, Friebe, and Karberg, “Becoming Biohackers”; Dobson, From Wassenaar to Mars; 
Errera, “InfraGard Partnership for Protection Program”; Leibrand, “Working with the FDA”; Lempinen, 
“FBI, AAAS Collaborate.” 
171 Dobson, From Wassenaar to Mars; Lempinen, “FBI, AAAS Collaborate.” 
 82 
behaviors. Collaborative effects can mitigate some of this damage by conducting 
outreach, sharing concerns, and rebuilding relationships with isolated OSCs to remove 
potential inroads for nefarious actors.172  
Digital proliferation will have the biggest impact on types of weapons technology 
available to both states and non-state actors.173 The production model for technology and 
weapons has reversed from one where the government could transition technology over 
to civilian use to one that starts with civilian development of technologies which are then 
transitioned over for government or military use. Civilians have access to technology 
immediately as it is released, which makes it incredibly hard to regulate. Dual-use digital 
technologies in particular will be a significant challenge, as current regulations are nearly 
impossible to enforce online without resulting in negative effects and proliferation of the 
information. These technologies will become available to an increasing number of actors, 
and intelligence signatures will be reduced by the use of anonymizing tools and dark 
networks. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile production, and other types 
of operations will be harder to detect and discover and may occur at the non-state-actor 
level. This calls for a new counterproliferation model, one that is in part derived from the 
digital environment and that will require the addition of some new tools. 
E. ACTIVE EFFECTS 
The tools described in this section, while new to the government and 
policymakers, certainly are not new to the business world. They are highly effective and 
are used on a daily basis, including for gathering open-source intelligence. As 
proliferation goes digital, counterproliferation efforts must incorporate some of these 
same tools to track and proactively defeat threat actors. This will require the assistance of 
OSCs and the open-source intelligence that only they, as digital natives, can provide. One 
of the biggest barriers to the use of the tools in this section will be bureaucratic. These 
tools are unconventional, rely on others operating as private contractors, and require 
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autonomy in execution and operation, all factors that typically make nation-states 
uncomfortable. Yet they are used globally by major corporations to stay ahead of 
competitors, to provide a view to the future, to avoid or neutralize threats, or to stay 
ahead of the next RLT’s disruptions. Active Effects will require a paradigm shift in 
security operation and will require a significant amount of trust in and freedom of action 
for those involved.174 
Active efforts best suited to this type of proactive general deterrence include the 
use of cyber bounties, posted contracts requesting specific information and a reward for 
that information. The FBI already does this when searching for information on cyber 
criminals, and it’s a good start. Corporations such as Microsoft and United Airlines have 
“bug bounties” which request assistance from private contractors to help find dangerous 
holes in software or hardware that could be exploited. These bounties encourage 
individuals or small teams to participate. Other efforts utilize a stacked approach in which 
individuals can accept a bounty and then send out a call for information to their networks. 
If the information is located, the individual at the top of the network receives a certain 
percentage of the bounty and the individuals who found the information as well as those 
who referred them to the bounty are also rewarded.175 
Another option to be considered is reinvigorating the privateer clause under the 
US Constitution to utilize cyber privateers. Nations in the past had privateers to safeguard 
state property or locate specific criminals; cyber privateers could serve the same purpose. 
An individual or team could accept a contract to recover stolen goods, locate a black 
market enterprise, or identify cyber criminals and locate them for pickup by authorities. 
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In return, these individuals would receive a commission from the state (i.e., existing 
reward money, an amount agreed up front, or cryptocurrencies, bandwidth, or storage) 
and could also receive a percentage of the hardware or resources seized by authorities. 
The fulfillment of digital bounties that highlight grave threats to public safety, stop 
significant infrastructure attacks, or disrupt terrorism plots would give a proactive edge to 
US security. This would also enable the government to expand its capacity substantially 
at minimal extra cost, because the program would use funds and resources that already 
exist for reward programs. The establishment of a cyber-privateer clause would enable 
the government to use an additional set of tools providing temporary or long-term cyber 
assets to improve security and safety online. Cyber privateers would be a means of 
identifying and locating threat actors discreetly, disrupting the digital side of black 
market operations, and providing an extra level of cyber policing focused on threat-actor 
early warning and interdiction.176 
The final necessary piece is to continue to grow and evolve the network of 
national and international fusion centers. These centers are the incubators for the future of 
policing and international intelligence. Collaboration between government, private sector, 
and OSCs is critical for success, as is the structure of each center and the network as a 
whole. Such organizations will be hybrids, exceptionally agile and able to bridge the gap 
between government and the private and public sectors. Currently a collaborative group 
of businesses, academics, and members of the IC working out of Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory are discussing how best to meet national requirements and what 
form an entity working toward that should take. Efforts such as these should be 
encouraged, and suggestions should be solicited on how the government can use lessons 
                                                 
176 Arquilla, “To Build a Network”; Arquilla, “New Rules of War”; Grant, “Silicon Offset”; Dastin, 
“United Airlines Awards Hackers”; Keizer, “Microsoft Waves More Security”; Millman, “FBI Offers 
$4.2m in Bounties”; Polancich, “Incentivized Cyber Defense”; Schultz, Robert. "Countering Extremist 




learned from Silicon Valley and elsewhere to leapfrog security and intelligence 
forward.177 
F. OFFENSIVE EFFECTS 
At the extreme end of the spectrum are offensive effects. These tools provide a 
rapid response capability to crisis, a capability that includes access to both RLT subject-
matter expertise and technology-augmented forces that can respond, neutralize, and/or 
contain active threats. Like special operations forces, these teams will take time to grow, 
will not be mass producible, and will be most effective when focused long term on a 
specific region of the world. Due to the nature and capabilities of RLT, especially within 
the CBRN-E realm, a cadre of technology-specialized forces will need to be developed to 
form the core of tactical tech/cyber/SOF strike teams that will be 24/7 worldwide 
deployable. Much of this capability exists and is already regionally focused. The majority 
of the work will be on how to incorporate new tools into the mix, how to respond to an 
RLT-generated event, and how these teams should be structured. Another key feature is 
to ensure that these teams have interjurisdictional capabilities to conduct emergency 
response around the globe. When an incident occurs, nations must be willing to accept 
help from a trained response unit or have their own capability on hand. An RLT event is 
the responsibility of all, so in these cases, it is imperative that nations work together so 
the crisis does not become a regional or global threat.178 
Special operations forces around the globe are best suited for such operations and 
are agile enough to incorporate new tools. Some options would be establishing a vetted 
network of dedicated digital natives around the globe to provide active support during a 
crisis, creating a civilian technology- and cyber-militia from the tech centers around the 
United States to be an online presence for special mission unit reach-back under the 
leadership of Silicon Valley, and to establish decentralized autonomous technology teams 
(DATT) to provide early warning and open-source intelligence, with the authority to 
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conduct small-scale digital interdictions and disruptions to protect national security, 
public safety, or critical assets. The DATT must be allowed freedom to operate as fluidly 
as their technological competitors on the web. The capacity and expertise for tools and 
teams like these are available via OSC partners, bounties, or cyber privateers. By 
partnering with OSC members and creating agile networks that can keep pace with the 
networks spawning RLT, the United States will be able to keep current with the steep 
curve of exponential innovation. This will require a new level of transparency, a 
willingness to partner with outside entities (some of which are very different from the 
mainstream), and the ability for these units and entities to act autonomously the majority 
of the time to prevent developing or active threats from achieving a successful end state. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is my hope that this thesis will serve as a basic primer to the risks and benefits 
of the technological revolution that is upon us as well as a cautionary tale for those 
charged with the difficult task of policy development, regulation and enforcement. RLT 
will produce unprecedented effects that will require ingenuity, thoughtfulness and an 
agility that does not come easily to government entities. It will also require those in 
positions of power to reassess established protocols and consider ways to expand the 
existing circle of trust to include influential OSCs in planning for the next generation of 
international security. 
Technology may already hold some of the answers. The incorporation of ethical 
design into RLT as well as active engagement with key technology drivers will likely 
produce creative and effective solutions to limit potential threat uses. Technology 
licensing is another possible solution that may help to ensure the technologies most at 
risk of illicit use are used in a responsible, ethical manner. Biometrics, improved digital 
immersion by providing a more active online presence and education and training on 
RLT are all options that should be discussed and considered within the sphere of possible 
solutions. 
The recipe for success however lies with the incorporation of OSC participants. 
The online culture has much to teach us and many of these groups are more than willing 
to collaborate to make the world a safer place for everyone. As I write this, the actions of 
OSCs taken in response to the ISIS Paris attacks bear witness to this truth. Social media 
outlets are being used to warn of danger, to find shelter, and to provide authorities with 
important information. Hacktivist groups are operating in overdrive to shut down ISIS 
accounts and provide law enforcement with critical planning intelligence gleaned from 
terrorist chats and posts. Self-policing efforts by Twitter and Telegram have deleted ISIS 
propaganda channels. This is the power of people at work in a million different ways and 
places and times to fight terrorism. This is the untapped capacity of people who want to 
improve global security. A billion sets of eyes around the globe are watching and 
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warning, helping nations to fight back and keep the public safe by leveraging RLT. Cyber 
bounties, cyber privateering and collaborative teaming to establish a permanent vetted 
cyber civilian militia for 24/7 reach back support are all options to increase capacity, 
agility and expertise at low or no cost. 
A great deal of work remains. The spectrum of solutions is just a simple 
framework at this point, a skeleton that needs a great deal of fleshing out. This will 
require the work of unconventionally minded, imaginative individuals who aren’t afraid 
to get their hands dirty by jumping in and doing science. Priority areas for research under 
the RLT umbrella include much needed deep dives on synthetic biology, 
neurotechnology, and additive manufacturing, as well as advanced robotics, 
nanotechnology, and advanced genomics. Serious work on understanding these 
technologies, their drivers and the culture behind them is critical to defining what 
deterrence will look like in the next five years. Works on the viability of collaborative 
efforts such as the FBI DIYBio outreach and Silicon Valley’s use of cyber bounties will 
provide much needed data on the development of comprehensive collaborative plans 
enhanced by the capacity and expertise of OSCs. Finally, a study on how to best build 
capacity using nontraditional partners such as OSC groups is long overdue. The networks 
necessary to defeat malicious actor networks may already exist in these spaces, they just 
need to be identified. Hacktivists are not the only groups making a difference. 
Understanding how to team with these entities to achieve limited or long term goals will 
help to increase international security. 
This is an interesting time to be alive, and RLT will make it more so. The RLT 
problem set will be challenging, but there are viable, inexpensive solutions that can 
promote awareness through education, cultural understanding, and partnering. Policy will 
be the lynchpin in this area. In a world where non-state actors are already flexing their 
muscles and challenging heads of state directly via social media, it is only a matter of 
time before these same groups leverage developing technologies to more serious purpose. 
The current nation-state system exists in part because conflict brought all nations together 
to seek a better solution. It is only a matter of time before one nation’s technological or 
cyber concerns become a concern for other nations, and if this nation-state system is to 
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continue to function successfully, it is critical that world leaders recognize the need for 
interjurisdictional, transnational policy that is smart, global, and enforceable. This 
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